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A R T I C L E S

Inefficient
Efficiency: Crying
Over Spilled
Water
by Vanessa Casado Pérez
Vanessa Casado Pérez is an associate professor of law at Texas
A&M School of Law and a research associate professor at
Texas A&M Department of Agricultural Economics.

Summary
As the drought in western states worsens, the agricultural sector is being criticized for failing to adopt
technical responses, such as shifting to less waterdemanding crops and state-of-the-art irrigation
systems. However, these responses alone are insufficient to reduce water consumption if unaccompanied by changes in how the law defines and allocates
water rights. This Article proposes a redefinition of
water rights to ensure that changes in crops or irrigation techniques are socially efficient. It proposes
“prior consumption” as an additional measure of water
rights in prior appropriation regimes, one that more
accurately reflects the true social cost of agricultural
water use. This would prevent farmers from taking
advantage of technical responses to increase their water
use and would protect downstream users and the environment. In addition, water markets would benefit,
since water rights would be better defined and the
review process of water market transactions would be
streamlined. The proposal is consistent with the underlying principles of prior appropriation, and would survive a potential takings challenge.
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A

s of 2016, California is facing the fifth year of a serious drought. Other western states already suffer or
are likely to suffer from similar scarcity in the near
future due to climate change. As the largest water user, the
agricultural sector1 is widely criticized for misusing irrigation water by employing inefficient irrigation methods and
growing water-intensive crops. The critique even made a
New York Times Sunday editorial.2
As a response to the scarcity crisis, it is often argued
that the agricultural sector should be more efficient, for
instance, by adopting so-called efficient irrigation systems. Sprinklers and drip irrigation, which have little to
no return flows, are thus expected to solve our water woes
by ensuring that the agricultural sector conserves water for
other users.3 However, this is not the case. Experts have
proven that technically efficient irrigation systems may
end up consuming more water than traditional irrigation
methods.4 This is because flood or furrow irrigation methAuthor’s Note: I am grateful for feedback from participants in the Stanford
Fellows’ Workshop, the Junior Environmental Scholars Workshop (University
of Washington School of Law), the American West Workshop at the Bill Lane
Center (Stanford University), the Sustainability Conference for American
Legal Educators (Arizona State University), the Water in the West Workshop
(Stanford Woods Institute), the Climate Change, Energy, and Natural
Resources Law & Policy Works-in-Progress Symposium (University of
Colorado Law School and Duke University School of Law), and the Society
of Environmental Law and Economics annual meeting at the University of
Texas at Austin. I thank Bruce E. Cain, Anne Castle, Richard A. Epstein,
Lee Fenell, Ron Griffin, Cathy Hwang, Mark Kelman, David Kosar, Rhett
Larson, Yael Lifshitz, Jonathan Masur, Maggie Niu, Michael Pappas,
Ariel Porat, Manuel Pulido-Velázquez, Matt Roach, Jacob H. Russell, Eric
Singer, David Sklansky, Buzz H. Thompson, Frank Ward, and Katrina
M. Wyman for useful discussions and comments on drafts of this Article at
different stages. I am also indebted to Paxton Hehmeyer and Preeti Piplani
for their patience in helping me edit this Article.
I also want to thank officials at the Oregon Water Resources Board, at the
Colorado Division of Water Resources, and Karl Nyquist from the farming
corporation C&A for their help with figuring out the intricacies of irrigation.
Usual disclaimers apply: all errors are mine. Comments welcome: vcasado@
law.tamu.edu.
1.	
2.	
3.	

4.	

In California, agricultural use amounts to 80% of the water consumed,
while its contribution to the state’s gross domestic product is 2%.
Watering California’s Farms, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 2015.
Conservation is not a univocal concept. In this Article, it is used to mean
making more water available to others. However, A. Dan Tarlock notes that
“in this century [the 20th century] ‘conservation’ has been defined either
as maximizing the use of water by augmenting the supply or as an efficient
engineering method of using less water to achieve the objective.” A. Dan
Tarlock, The Changing Meaning of Water Conservation in the West, 66 Neb.
L. Rev. 145, 147 (1987).
Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velázquez, Water Conservation in Irrigation
Can Increase Water Use, 105 PNAS 18215 (2008); Ray Huffaker & Norman
Whittlesey, The Allocative Efficiency and Conservation Potential of Water
Laws Encouraging Investments in On-Farm Irrigation Technology, 24 Agric.
Econ. 47 (2000); Brian Venn et al., Hydrologic Impacts Due to Changes in
Conveyance and Conversion From Flood to Sprinkler Irrigation Practices, 130
J. Irrigation & Drainage Engineering 192 (2004); Aurélien Dumont
et al., Is the Rebound Effect or Jevons Paradox a Useful Concept for Better
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ods do not consume all water diverted: a large part of it
goes back to the river via return flow. With drip irrigation, this is not the case: plants consume almost all of the
water and there is no return flow. Thus, once some farmers
adopt technically efficient irrigation methods, other users,
including the environment, who were relying on the return
flow can no longer use that water and streamflow downstream is reduced.5
Adopting efficient irrigation systems does not achieve
the goal pursued by conservation policies of saving water
for other users. Policies advocating for technological solutions without taking into account this “rebound effect” are
misleading. Given how overallocated streams are, the extra
water consumed using drip irrigation is water that some
other user had been relying on for decades. The adoption of
drip irrigation or sprinklers may translate into water being
in fewer hands. The U.S. Supreme Court case Montana v.
Wyoming6 illustrates this point: the Yellowstone River that
these two states share had less water than it did in 1950
when they signed the compact. In the 2000s, there was
not enough water flowing to Montana because Wyoming
farmers adopted sprinkler irrigation systems and consumed
more than before.
Drip irrigation and sprinkler systems are labeled efficient because they increase the yield at the plot installed
or lose less water to evaporation or return flow. However,
the desirability of their adoption should be analyzed on
the basis of their positive effect on the overall water use
value. If some farmers adopt drip or sprinklers and increase
their yields, but other farmers are no longer able to produce
because they are deprived of the return flow, the change in
the overall allocation is not a Pareto-efficient improvement.
Not only may the adoption of technically efficient irrigation systems be unfair to users who have been relying on
return flows, it may also be inefficient.
The burden should be on proponents of new technologies to prove that the aggregate outcome constitutes
an improvement (or, in other words, is Kaldor-Hicksefficient even if not Pareto-efficient); that is, that their
increased profits could hypothetically offset the losses
imposed on users who can no longer irrigate. But this is
Management of Water Resources? Insights From the Irrigation Modernisation
Process in Spain, 1 Aquatic Procedia 64 (2013); Julio Berbel et al.,
Literature Review on Rebound Effect of Water Saving Measures and Analysis of
a Spanish Case Study, 29 Water Res. Mgmt. 663 (2014).
5.	 Technical Work Group for the Interagency Task Force on
Irrigation Efficiencies, Irrigation Water Use, and Management, at
Glossary 1-5 (June 1978 review draft), cited in George W. Pring & Karen
A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to Conservation and Efficient Use of
Water in the West, 25 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 4 (1979) (“It is estimated
that return flow amounts to 92 million acre feet annually as compared
to the 79 million acre feet consumed by crops each year. Return flow is
commonly utilized downstream but it carries the problems of erosion and
water quality degradation.”).
6.	 131 S. Ct. 1765, 179 L. Ed. 2d 799, 41 ELR 20168 (2011).

12-2016

not what prior appropriation, the regime that allocates
water in the West, establishes: as the Supreme Court
stated in the aforementioned interstate compact dispute,
farmers are allowed to change irrigation methods even if
their consumption goes up.
The notion that conservation strategies may backfire is
not new. However, the scholarship on water law has rarely
considered this possibility. The discussion in the energyefficiency world has been heated for a long time. Fuelefficient cars may induce driving more miles because of
cheaper fuel, increasing overall emissions compared with
less-efficient cars. Efficient appliances may save less energy
than we expect because the amount a consumer saves in
her energy bill is spent on other goods in her basket that
consume energy. This is known as the rebound effect. The
increase in consumption when changing irrigation methods can be considered an extreme example of the rebound
effect. Users will increase how much they drive, but rarely
will drive twice as much. But with water-efficiency measures farmers, particularly in water-short basins, are likely
to consume as much as possible if this allows them to
increase production.
An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
report calls for taking into consideration the potential
rebound effect when calculating energy savings. Likewise,
water regulation should not accept at face value that technologically efficient measures produce real water savings
and bring our water allocation closer to efficiency. Prior
appropriation needs to account for this rebound effect.
Prior appropriation defines water rights according to the
volume diverted and, thus, it allows farmers to consume as
much as they have the right to divert. Accordingly, when
adopting technically efficient irrigation systems, they can
consume more water than they were consuming previously.
Hence, prior appropriation does not ensure that when
changes in consumption happen, the new allocation is
equal or more efficient than the status quo. Even more, as
shall be seen, it encourages farmers to consume as much as
possible because those farmers may fear losing their rights
due to non-use. This is why I propose including an additional variable—historical consumption—in the definition of prior appropriation water rights; users will be able
to consume only what they have been consuming historically, thus preventing the rebound effect. Introducing consumption as a limit allows farmers to change the irrigation
method if it is Pareto-efficient to do so; the farmer adopting drip irrigation increases her profits and the rest of the
users are not harmed. But as I explain, this proposal would
also facilitate the purchase of water from those less efficient
by those who need to increase the amount consumed once
they install a different irrigation system.
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The above proposal addresses not only irrigation efficiency, but also other choices that farmers make that may
affect water consumption. This is particularly the case for
crop choice. Farmers are free to choose which crop they
may grow. Their choices are often highly influenced by federal and state subsidies. Alfalfa production in California’s
Central Valley has been the focus of critiques for many
years because it is a low-value crop that consumes a lot of
subsidized water.7
Today, many critics focus on the high levels of water
required to grow almonds, a crop increasingly adopted
by California growers even in the midst of the current
water crisis. Almonds are profitable because their market
price is high, but almond trees require more water than
the crops previously grown in the same area. In addition,
they introduce inflexibility in the water management
system; almond trees cannot be fallowed in the event of
a crisis. If farmers were restricted to consume the same
amount they have been consuming historically, their
choice of crops would be limited. They could change and
grow almond trees, but if the nuts require more water
than a previous crop, farmers would plant fewer acres or
buy extra water.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I describes the
choices that farmers have and the potential impacts on
water distribution and efficiency. Section II analyzes how
those changes are treated under prior appropriation law.
Section III describes different regulatory options to deal
with the effects of farmers’ choices in water use, proposes
using consumptive use as a measure of water rights, and
analyzes the strengths and challenges of such a proposal,
mainly the measurement difficulty and the potential takings challenges. Section IV concludes.

I.

Irrigation Efficiency: Effects

A.

Farmers’ Choices

Farmers have many choices when trying to make the most
of their water, which, individually, means obtaining the
maximum amount of profit per drop. First, they may
improve current systems, both of irrigation and of water
conveyance. They can level their fields when using flood
irrigation, allowing a more even distribution of water, or
adopt optimal irrigation schedules catering to the plants’
needs. Farmers may also reduce transfer losses; they may
improve the conveyance system from the river or stream
from where they take their water to their field. But as the
water savings achieved by lining the All-American Canal
show, those changes are not necessarily a Pareto improvement. As a result of the canal lining, farmers in Mexico
did not have enough groundwater to irrigate. It inhibited
water seeping, which recharged the aquifers on the other
side of the frontier. Conveyance infrastructure improve7.	

Justin Fox, Why California Needs Thirsty Alfalfa, Bloomberg, May 26, 2015,
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-26/why-they-growthirsty-alfalfa-in-parched-california.
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ments pursued by irrigation districts could result in similar outcomes.
Second, farmers may change the type of crop they are
growing. Water consumption varies depending on the crop.
Farmers maximize their revenues. The amount of water
they are legally entitled to and that is available to them
may be a constraint if the volume is lower than some crops
require. Provided they have enough water, farmers will
grow the crop that brings them more profits, once other
variable costs are taken into account. Depending on the
state where the farmer resides, these choices are sometimes
distorted because farmers not only get the market price for
their harvest, but also some federal or state subsidies.
Third, farmers can shift to more technically efficient
irrigation methods. Changing to sprinklers or drip irrigation entails high upfront fixed costs.8 Such an investment
will not always be profitable. It will depend on the type of
soil, the water available to farmers, and the crop farmers
want to grow. Federal and state governments have given
incentives to farmers to shift irrigation systems based on
the idea that they will conserve water. These incentives take
two forms: direct funding of those mechanisms, or grant
farmers title to the amount of water they save. Granting
title to the amount of water conserved implies that farmers can sell that water.9 The statutes that grant the farmer
rights to the water conserved by changing the irrigation
method or taking other measures have, to a great extent,
acknowledged the rebound effect described in the introduction. These statutes only grant title to the amount of
water really conserved; the shift in irrigation systems cannot cause an increase in consumption.
However, there are programs at the state and federal
levels that fund technically efficient irrigation methods
but do not consider the potential effects of changing those
methods. Also, farmers may decide to change the methods just because it is economically sensible for them to do
so even if systemically it has deleterious effects. The management of drip irrigation implies less labor costs while
producing a higher yield. For the water system, drip irrigation ensures that pesticides and fertilizers are not carried back to the river via return flows. Hence, nonpoint
source pollution is reduced.
The type of crop also influences the choice of irrigation method. In general, field crops like alfalfa are usually
less amenable to drip irrigation than garden crops such as
vegetables. Drip irrigation is also not advisable in areas
where water contains high levels of salinity because salt
can build up on the field. Similarly, if surface water supply is not continuous, drip irrigation may not work as well
as it does when the source is groundwater because with
8.	

9.	

It is estimated that drip irrigation requires an investment between $800
and $1,200 per acre. Ari Michelsen et al., Evaluation of Irrigation
Efficiency Strategies for Far West Texas: Feasibility, Water Savings,
and Cost Considerations 52 (2009).
Such provisions need to ensure that farmers do not fear the forfeiture of
their rights. In prior appropriation, unused rights can be forfeited by the
water agency. For a discussion of forfeiture and the incentives arising from
that institution, see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the latter, the farmer can dictate when her demand will
be satisfied. In sum, it is a factual inquiry whether adopting technically efficient irrigation methods is more beneficial than costly, but the assumption that it is always an
improvement is a mistake.

B.

Example

The following example and figures describe how a shift in
irrigation methods changes the flow, yield, and water available for other users and the environment.10 For simplicity
purposes, I assume that rights are only defined by volume,
not by flow per unit of time as they normally are in prior
appropriation states. I illustrate the change from flood
irrigation to drip irrigation. The results could be similar if
instead of drip, a farmer adopts microspray, which is a type
of sprinkler. Traditional sprinklers are also an improvement over flood or furrow irrigation, and may consume
more water. Not all methods are suited to all environments. For example, center pivot sprinklers may not be
suited to windy environments because the water may be
carried away before it reaches the soil. Similarly, drip irrigation may be problematic for areas where water is saline,
requiring extra management.
The effects may be similar whenever there is a change in
irrigation management that increases the amount of water
consumed. Lining the canals should not increase consumption per se but it may change where water returns to
the basin; before lining the canals, water used to percolate,
but after, it may reenter as return flow. Changing the crop
grown may also translate to increased water consumption.
The situation portrayed here illustrates what happens in
areas like the Lower Rio Grande or Colorado’s Big Thompson project, where irrigators rely on others’ return flows.
In water-short scenarios, drip irrigation tends to consume
more than flood irrigation if the user is not receiving the
full amount of water that she needs. This is a likely situation in many western states where scarcity has dictated that
very few farmers receive their full allotments every year. In
a water-scarce scenario, it is likely that fewer users will be
able to use water once efficient irrigation systems have been
installed.11 As mentioned, pollution will be reduced if drip
is installed, but pollution is also more concentrated the less
water there is.
However, in other situations, return flows are not being
reused. For example, in the Imperial and Coachella Valleys, runoff from agricultural producers flows to the Salton
10. Most of the data (crop yield, evapotranspiration, and crop price) is taken
from Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velázquez’s study in the Lower Rio
Grande Basin, one of the studies that looks holistically at the effects
of shifting to technically efficient irrigation methods. Ward & PulidoVelázquez, supra note 4.
11. Scholars exploring the shift from flood irrigation to center pivot sprinklers
have shown that the more water-short the scenario, the more consumption
goes up when changing irrigation methods (from flood to sprinklers in
their case) even though the acreage is lower when applying center pivot.
Daniel M. O’Brien et al., Economics of Surface to Sprinkler Irrigation System
Conversion for Lower Capacity Systems, Kan. St. U., http://www.k-state.edu/
irrigate/reports/irrext2k.pdf.
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Sea, a saline lake created by that runoff. In this case, reducing runoff to the Salton Sea would not necessarily generate
a negative outcome; however, the surrounding ecosystem
has grown dependent on the existence of this salty lake,
and excessive reductions in runoff could threaten the fish
and wildlife now reliant on agricultural runoff.12 Still, in
water-abundant areas, return flows may not have been
appropriated yet. Thus, the increase in consumption may
not affect other consumptive uses because there is enough
water to satisfy them. Environmental flows will be nonetheless reduced but perhaps not to levels that threaten the
survival of species. Those water-abundant areas are less and
less common in the West. Overappropriation is the norm.13

1.

Flood Irrigation

The first scenario (Scenario 1) is the situation before any
improvement in the irrigation system has been made. Two
farmers are using flood irrigation, a low-tech method where
the farmer, using gravity or pumps, diverts water out of the
stream and covers the whole field with water. From that
water, the amount of water lost to the river is the amount
evaporated and the amount consumed by the plants. Plants
receive part of the water. However, because the water does
not target the plants, part of it evaporates and/or is irretrievably lost from the basin as it seeps and becomes unrecoverable groundwater.14 The rest of the water goes back to
the river or recharges the aquifers.
Flood irrigation is a cheaper method in terms of capital
investment but, depending on the scale of the agricultural
production, may incur more variable costs, such as fertilizers and labor, than other irrigation methods. A system
similar to flood irrigation is furrow. Furrow irrigation also
uses gravity to move water around the field, but instead of
flooding the whole acreage, water gets channeled by dirt
furrows. Flood and furrow have lower yields than other
irrigation methods because water does not reach plants in
the optimal places or at the optimal times.
Farmer A grows alfalfa, a crop that is often blamed for
consuming a lot of water, and is common, for example, in
California’s Imperial Valley,15 a former desert.16 The river,
as it reaches farmer A’s plot, has available 8.5 acre-feet (acft). Farmer A has a right to use 5 ac-ft, and in Scenario 1 she
diverts that amount to irrigate her crop. Her production of
12. Sue McClurg, The Salton Sea: The Environmental and Economic Values of This
Vast Inland Lake Prompt Local Officials to Launch a New Restoration Effort,
Water Educ. Found. (Mar./Apr. 1994), available at http://www.sci.sdsu.
edu/salton/EnvirnEconValueSaltonSea.html.
13. Gregory J. Hobbs Jr., Beneficial Use & Anti-Speculation, Can These Water
Law Principles Meet the Challenges of Climate Change?, 137 Water Rep. 1
(2015).
14. The extracted water ends up as: (1) beneficial evapotranspiration, which is
the part that the plant consumes; (2) non-beneficial evapotranspiration, that
is, evaporation; and (3) nonrecoverable runoff or percolation. Charles M.
Burt et al., Irrigation Performance Measures: Efficiency and Uniformity, 123 J.
Irrigation & Drainage Engineering 423 (1997).
15. Imperial Irrigation District, Annual Inventory of Areas Receiving
Water: Years 2013, 2012, 2011, available at http://www.iid.com/home/
showdocument?id=9071.
16. Harry T. Cory & William P. Blake, The Imperial Valley and the
Salton Sink 24 (1915).
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alfalfa amounts to 8 tons that she sells at a price of $130
per ton. She has a return flow of 2.8 ac-ft, which means
that the stream between plot A and plot B has 6.3 ac-ft
available. The return flow can be used by other farmers and
feed instream flows. For the purposes of the example, there
are no groundwater effects. The evapotranspiration (ET)
or the amount consumed (that is, depleted from the river)
is 2.2 ac-ft. Not all of the 2.2 ac-ft of water is consumed
by the plants.
Water that is not lost or wasted reenters the stream as
return flow, available to downstream users and the overall
ecosystem. In Scenario 1, farmer B produces pecans using
flood irrigation. He relies on farmer A’s return flow because
he needs to divert 6 ac-ft from the 6.3 ac-ft available. His
return flow is 3.1 ac-ft and the stream carries downstream
3.4 ac-ft.

2.

Adopting Drip Irrigation

In Scenario 2, farmer A decides to change her irrigation
method and she shifts from flood to drip irrigation. Once
she has installed drip irrigation, she diverts 2.7 ac-ft (less
diversion than Scenario 1), but she consumes all of it. There
is no return flow. In the example, her yield has increased
25%, so her revenues have also gone up: from $1,040 in
Scenario 1 to $1,300 in Scenario 2. Farmer A’s diversion is
lower, but her consumption has increased, so there is less
water available in the stream after her plot.
In Scenario 2, the stream does not carry enough water
for farmer B if he keeps using the same irrigation method
and depends on farmer A’s return flow to fulfill his needs.
If farmer B cannot produce, the increase in revenues by
farmer A is not enough to offset farmer B’s losses. He,
of course, could use all of the water available (or all the
water available minus the water needed in the stream to
protect the ecosystem if there was a minimum streamflow imposed) and still produce. But his production will
decrease assuming no change in irrigation methods. The
river flow will also decrease.
Drip irrigation is normally considered a more “efficient” irrigation method. It produces more crop per drop;
that is, drip irrigation maximizes water productivity for
that particular crop in a particular field. This efficiency,
akin to technical efficiency,17 only refers to the particular
farmer; it says nothing about the impact on allocative efficiency, that is, on whether it is efficient at a systemic level.
If the farmer decides to change the irrigation system, then
drip irrigation must also be economically efficient for the
individual farmer because it may bring her more profit,
which will allow her to recover the investment. But it
may not be efficient in terms of the overall value obtained
with water if other users cannot irrigate as a result of the
increase in consumption.

17. For a discussion of the positions of welfarists and environmentalists
advocating economic efficiency as a reaction to the technological efficiency
embraced in the 20th century, see Tarlock, supra note 3, at 147.
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Scenario 3 presents exactly the same situation as Scenario 2, except farmer B also installs drip irrigation. It may
be thought that farmer A’s change of irrigation method
will give farmer B the proper incentive to do so. However,
as the example shows, drip also increases farmer B’s consumption, and thus there may be less water available for
instream flows and other users downstream of farmer B.
There is no way to know ex ante whether those users that
now cannot irrigate would have produced more or less than
the increase in farmers A and B’s production resulting from
the irrigation system change.
In Scenario 2, it is clear that the shift in irrigation systems by farmer A is not a Pareto improvement.18 Whether
it could be Kaldor-Hicks-efficient will depend on whether
the increase in farmer A’s benefits due to increased yield,
minus the capital investment in drip irrigation, is enough
to offset not only farmer B’s losses, but also those of further downstream users and the environment. Drip also has
social benefits in the form of reduced nonpoint source pollution. However, there are regulations addressing nonpoint
source pollution and, assuming those are enforced, if drip
is the most efficient method to comply with them, farmers
will change the irrigation method accordingly. Hence, if
anything, pollution abatement may provide further incentives for farmers to adopt drip irrigation no matter how the
volume of the right is calculated.
Proponents lauding the technical efficiency of drip irrigation do not fully consider whether water is being used in
the most socially efficient way, which is what our policies
prescribing or encouraging the shift to drip or sprinklers
aim to achieve. In fact, it may well be that water, like many
other assets, has decreasing marginal returns. This means
that the extra water consumed by farmer A in Scenario 2
may produce less return than the same water being used by
farmer B who could not irrigate otherwise. In other words,
the increased revenue of the farmer whose consumption
grows is not enough to offset the decrease in revenue of the
farmer who now cannot irrigate at all.19
In sum, individually efficient irrigation systems are not
equivalent to systemic efficiency. Also, if the measure of
success were food production, the shift in irrigation methods only tells us that farmer A will produce more, but it
does not tell much about the effects on overall agricultural
production. The status quo may not be efficient, but a
shift toward technically efficient irrigation methods does
not unequivocally bring about a better situation systemically, even if some farmers produce more and pollute less,
18. For a review of the concepts of technical and allocative efficiency and how
legal scholarship has used them, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the
Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 591 (1980).
19. Deficit irrigation exposes the crop to a certain level of water stress. Sam
Geerts & Rick Gaes, Deficit Irrigation as an On-Farm Strategy to Maximize
Crop Water Productivity in Dry Areas, 96 Agric. Water Mgmt. 1275
(2009). Their analysis confirms that deficit irrigation can stabilize crop
yields, not maximize them, provided there is some moisture. Some crops
are better-suited to this than others, for example sugar beets and sunflowers.
See Cevat Kirda, Deficit Irrigation Scheduling Based on Plant Growth Stages
Shoring Water Stress Tolerance, in Deficit Irrigation Practices (Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2002).

Copyright © 2016 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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because other farmers and the environment are likely to
suffer from reduced water availability.
Scenarios 2 and 3 should not be problematic from an
efficiency viewpoint if there were a perfectly functioning
market for irrigation water. If that were the case, farmer A

46 ELR 11051

could sell the extra amount of water she is now consuming
to farmer B if he valued it more because he could profit
more from it than farmer A. Or farmer A could sell it to
those who want to protect the environment. But such a
market does not exist.20

SCENARIO 1

Diversion:
5 ac-ft

Farmer A
Flood Irrigation
Alfalfa
Yield: 8 tons
Revenue: $1,040
Evapotranspiration
(ET): 2.2 ac-ft

Return
flow:
2.8 ac-ft

8.5 ac-ft

Diversion:
6 ac-ft

Farmer B
Flood Irrigation
Pecans
Yield: 1,158.1 lb
Revenue: $2,640.47
ET: 2.6 ac-ft

Return
flow:
3.4 ac-ft

3.7 ac-ft

6.3 ac-ft

SCENARIO 2

Diversion:
2.7 ac-ft

Farmer A
Drip Irrigation
Alfalfa
Yield: 10 tons
Revenue: $1,300
ET: 2.7 ac-ft

Farmer B
Drip Irrigation
Pecans
Yield: ?
Revenue: ?
ET: ?

Return
flow:
0 ac-ft

8.5 ac-ft

5.8 ac-ft

SCENARIO 3

Diversion:
2.7 ac-ft

8.5 ac-ft

Farmer A
Drip Irrigation
Alfalfa
Yield: 10 tons
Revenue: $1,300
ET: 2.7 ac-ft

Return
flow:
0 ac-ft

Diversion:
3.2 ac-ft

5.8 ac-ft

Farmer B
Drip Irrigation
Pecans
Yield: 1,447.7 lb
Revenue: $3,300.76
ET: 3.2 ac-ft

Return
flow:
0 ac-ft

2.6 ac-ft

20. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. As Section III.C. will
describe, the proposal this Article puts forward may make water markets
more efficient by reducing transaction costs.
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Beyond this hypothetical example, there are several
basinwide studies testing how technically efficient irrigation methods affect water distribution and welfare.21 For
example, Frank Ward and Manuel Pulido-Velázquez analyze the effects of subsidized efficient irrigation techniques
in the Upper Rio Grande Basin in the United States, specifically the 89,000 acres served by the Elephant Butte Irrigation District.22 Their findings confirm that return flows
are an important source of supply for downstream users.23
Their study considers the benefits and costs to farmers
from increased yield, surplus of urban consumers, and net
ecological benefits of reduced pollution and reduced flow,
taking into account the enjoyment of nature as well as the
costs of preserving it. Their results show that the adoption
of those technologies does not reduce water usage even if
the farmers are diverting less. The environment suffers. In
their study, even though the change is beneficial for farmers as a group in the basin, it is not beneficial for the overall population.
Ward and Pulido-Velázquez provide their analysis on an
aggregated basis, so it is not possible to analyze the harm
imposed to some agricultural users. It is also not possible
to identify whether farmers could increase yields to a profitable volume when shifting irrigation systems without
increasing consumption. Government subsidies, at both
the federal and state levels, play an important role in shaping the choices of the agricultural sector. As Section II.F.
explains, existing public policy assumes that by encouraging the agricultural sector to adopt innovative irrigation
technologies, more water will be available for other users
and the environment. This logic is flawed and oversimplifies the reality of how more technically efficient irrigation
systems function.
As Section II describes, the response that prior appropriation gives to certain individual technically efficient measures is unsatisfactory. To avoid the potentially undesirable
effects that could arise from an increase in consumption,
this Article puts forward a proposal in Section III: adding
consumption as a variable to the definition of water rights
under prior appropriation. This proposal is not the only
way to address some of the effects that arise from changing
irrigation methods, as Section III.F. shows.
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West, where the most profitable uses, like mining or irrigated agriculture, occurred further from the streams. The
shortcomings of riparianism paved the way for a shift to
prior appropriation, under which rights to use water are
acquired by diverting water and putting it to beneficial use.
Prior appropriation’s original goal was producing as much
as possible.
Charles Meyers summarizes the elements of prior
appropriation in his 1971 report to the National Water
Commission:
A property right in the use of water is created by diversion
of the water from a stream (or lake) and its application to
a beneficial use. Water can be used at any location . . . In
the event of a shortage of supply, water will be supplied up
to a limit of the right in order of temporal priority: the last
man to divert and make use of the stream is the first to
have his supply cut off.24

Settlers of the states west of the 100th meridian understood early on that sensible allocation of water was key for
their societies to thrive. It did not take them long to learn
that legal solutions developed on the East Coast would
not provide much help. Riparianism, which confers upon
those owning a land adjacent to a river a right to a reasonable use of water, proved particularly ill-suited for the

Prior appropriation has remained the cornerstone of
water law in the American West. Modern statutory systems
have adopted the tenets of prior appropriation. The main
difference between common-law prior appropriation and
statutory prior appropriation is that under the latter, the
user needs to apply for a right before a water agency and,
thus, agencies have a tighter control over those rights.
The question of whether a farmer can increase her consumption if she does not divert more water when shifting
irrigation methods was addressed for the first time before
a court in the interstate compact dispute between Montana and Wyoming. The 1951 Yellowstone River Compact
grandfathered pre-1950 water use rights in both Montana
and Wyoming, giving those rights the highest priority.
Wyoming appropriators, the upstream users, consumed
more water as a result of adopting sprinklers as an irrigation
method, and there was not enough water for Montana’s pre1950 appropriators. Montana argued that such an increase
in consumption violated the compact. The Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether the technological change, and
the concomitant reduction in water flows, conformed to
the Yellowstone River Compact, which provided that pre1950 rights “shall continue to be enjoyed in accordance
with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water
under the doctrine of appropriation.”25
The Supreme Court, following the special master’s
report from 2011, concluded that the Compact did not
prohibit pre-1950 Wyoming appropriators from increasing
their consumption on existing acreage to the detriment of
pre-1950 Montana appropriators. Even though the decision of the Supreme Court is not binding for prior appropriation states when it comes to defining their water rights,
it serves as an analysis of how prior appropriation treats the
change in irrigation methods with the subsequent increase
in consumption. The position of Wyoming upstream made
it akin to the position of a senior right holder in the river.

21. See supra note 4.
22. Ward & Pulido-Velázquez, supra note 4.
23. Id. at 18219.

24. Charles J. Meyers, A Historical and Functional Analysis of the
Appropriation System 4 (1971).
25. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, art. V.A.

II.

Current Regulation and Its Problems

A.

Current Definition of Prior Appropriation Rights
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As the Court concludes, prior appropriation permits
such a change in irrigation methods, even if those changes
may increase the amount of water used. In fact, prior
appropriation may incentivize water rights holders to consume more. Some tenets of prior appropriation illustrate
this point.26
First, beneficial use is the “basis, the measure, and the
limit” of an appropriation.27 It is a necessary element to
establish a right. As a limit and a measure, beneficial use
affects two dimensions: the type of use and the amount
used. The type of use is of less consequence for present purposes, but it is important to note that this is one element
that has evolved through time. Initially, consistent with the
idea of unfettered consumption to maximize production,
only consumptive uses such as agricultural or domestic
were considered beneficial. Increasingly, though, non-consumptive ones have been recognized. Non-consumptive
uses not only include hydropower, but also the protection
of ecosystems.
In relation to the entitlement given by a water right,
prior appropriation grants a right to the amount of water
put to beneficial use. The amount put to beneficial use is
normally measured according to the amount diverted. Initially, it was so because diversion was a way to give notice
to other users that an appropriation was happening.28 In
fact, the ditch capacity was the limit; a farmer could not
obtain a right larger than the amount she could divert. It
was assumed that someone would not build infrastructure capable of conveying more water than they needed
because that would have been an irrational investment. In
fact, even today, some states use diversion facilities to measure the volume of the right that is used.29 Often, however,
26. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 179 L. Ed. 2d 799, 41 ELR 20168
(2011).
27. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983)
The issue we review is whether the district court reached a correct
determination of beneficial use as of 1980. It is settled that beneficial use expresses a dynamic concept, which is a “variable according
to conditions,” . . . the use cannot include any element of “waste”
which, among other things, precludes unreasonable transmission
loss and use of cost-ineffective methods.
Cost-effective methods is a very open-ended concept.
28. Barton H. Thompson Jr. et al., Legal Control of Water Resources
216 (5th ed. 2013).
		 In Montana v. Wyoming, the special master considered that depletion
could not be the measure of the right. Instead he, and the majority of the
Supreme Court, believed that the compact adopted diversion as the measure
as it was conventional at the time, while depletion was unfamiliar. Supplemental Opinion of the Special Master on Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss
Bill of Complaint 9 (Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Supplemental Opinion] on
Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota, No.137.
		 “Under prior appropriation, a diversion traditionally served dual purposes—providing notice of a user’s intent to appropriate water, and defining
the extent of the use.” In re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the Use of All
Water, 2002 MT 216, P22 (Mont. 2002).
29. The definition of conserved water in Oregon takes existing diversion as the
measure to calculate the baseline against which to measure conservation.
Or. Admin. R. 690-018-0020(4):
“Conserved Water” means that amount of water that results
from conservation measures, measured as the difference between:
(a) The smaller of the amount stated on the water right or the
maximum amount of water that can be diverted using the existing
facilities; and (b) The amount of water needed after implementation of conservation measures to meet the beneficial use under the
water right certificate.
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the amount in the paper right, which was normally based
just on the declaration of the appropriator, was larger than
the amount really put to use because the facilities were not
used to their full capacity.
Today, overstating rights is less common because the
agencies or the state engineers approve the applications.
However, agencies work under the premise that users are
not employing all the water they have been granted.30 For
example, in California, where the recording system is still
incomplete,31 rights have been granted for five times the
amount of water available.32 Such a situation exacerbates
the effects of allowing right holders to consume all the
water they were granted because other users have been relying for decades on those users’ return flows.
Even though many have labeled irrigation practices
like flood or furrow wasteful because some water evaporates and other goes back to the river, these practices
have not been outlawed by a thorough enforcement of
beneficial use.33 A beneficial use is a reasonable one34 and
there is no vested right to waste water.35 Rarely enforced,
the prohibition against waste has focus on the means
of conveyance36 or certain outrageous practices such as
drowning gophers. But irrigation practices have not been
tackled. Waste provisions have been interpreted in a way
that is very deferential to the irrigator’s choice of irrigation method.37 Beneficial use has thus not worked as a
technology-forcing doctrine.38 This current understanding of beneficial use that accepts historical irrigation
practices is often criticized for not encouraging conser30. Adell Amos, Freshwater Conservation in the Context of Energy and Climate
Policy: Assessing Progress and Identifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western
United States, 12 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 1, 42 (2011).
31. Theodore E. Grantham & Joshua H. Viers, 100 Years of California’s Water
Rights System: Patterns, Trends, and Uncertainty, 9 Envtl. Res. Letters 1, 3
(2014).
32. Id.
33. For a critical view of this interpretation as one that undermines prior
appropriation itself, see Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo:
Protecting Established Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of
Prior Appropriation, 28 Envtl. L. 881 (1998).
34. State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash.
1993).
		 The current Washington definition is: “Beneficial use involves the
application of a reasonable quantity of water to a non-wasteful use, such
as irrigation, domestic water supply, or power generation, to name a few.”
State of Washington, Department of Ecology, Water Rights, http://www.ecy.
wa.gov/programs/wr/rights/water-right-home.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2016).
35. David H. Getches, Water Law in a Nutshell 129 (2009).
36. Tonkin v. Winzell, 27 Nev. 88 (Nev. 1903). State ex rel. Crowley v. District
Court, 88 P.2d 23 (Mont. 1939). When some conveyance means have been
considered wasteful, the parties claiming the waste may be required to pay
part of the cost of the works to decrease waste and improve the efficiency of
the conveyance means.
37. “[A]n appropriator cannot be compelled to divert according to the most
scientific method known. He is entitled to make a reasonable use of the
water according to the general custom of the locality.” Janet C. Neuman,
Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture; The Inefficient Search for Efficient
Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 933 (1998).
38. Richard B. Stewart & Bruce A. Ackerman, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (1985). This is no different though than other
technology-forcing provisions adopted in antipollution statutes. When
an industry is subject to a best available technology provision, its permit
includes neither a vague reference imposing the most innovative technology
available nor a specific technology; instead, it quantifies how much pollutant
the permittee may discharge.
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vation.39 The current interpretation may change, but that
is yet to be seen.40
Given that the volume a water right entitled has been
roughly measured as the amount diverted, return flow
was included in the right. The doctrine of recapture confirms it. With few exceptions, a farmer or other water right
holder can recapture water before it leaves her property and
returns to the stream from which it came.41 The common
example to understand this doctrine is a user who employs
flood irrigation and thus returns a lot of water to the river,
and who builds a little paved ditch at the end of her property to collect water that would otherwise be lost to her
use because it was returning to the stream. Even though
junior users acquire rights to the stream as it exists42 and
depend on return flow, junior appropriators relying on others’ “waste” often have no legal claim to it.43
Another way to present the claim made by this Article is
to argue that return flow is insufficiently protected; those
who are relying on return flow should not be at the mercy
of other senior or upstream irrigators who decide to change
their crops or their irrigation systems. There are very few
39. There seems to be a contradiction between two values that waste provisions
may embody: economic efficiency and stability. While the anti-waste tenet
in beneficial use seems to be based on utilitarian values, the interpretation
seems to be based on stability and preservation of the status quo. Michael
Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 741 (2014).
40. Neuman, supra note 37.
41. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1775, 179 L. Ed. 2d 799, 41 ELR
20168 (2011).
42. As stated in Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co.:
This court has often said, in substance, that a junior appropriator of
water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as against his senior, in a
continuation of the conditions on the stream as they existed at the
time he made his appropriation. If this means anything, it is that
when the junior appropriator makes his appropriation he acquires
a vested right in the conditions then prevailing upon the stream,
and surrounding the general method of use of water therefrom.
He has a right to assume that these are fixed conditions and will so
remain, at least without substantial change, unless it appears that a
proposed change will not work harm to his vested rights.
Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co., 107 P. 1108, 1111 (Colo.
1910). The change planned by a senior in this case was changing the point
of diversion, but the principle it states should encompass the change of
irrigation methods.
43. Recapture must happen on one’s property before water has returned to the
stream. In the interstate water dispute mentioned above, Montana argued
that this rule does not apply when the water returns to the same stream from
which it was originally drawn, citing the Utah case Estate of Steed v. New
Escalante Irrigation Corp., 846 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1992). In this case, an estate
was unable to collect damages from an irrigation corporation that changed
its flood irrigation to a pipe-based sprinkler system, because the runoff
from irrigation would not have reached the same stream from which the
water was taken. Lawrence MacDonnell, analyzing Montana’s arguments in
Montana v. Wyoming in relation to this issue, claims that:
the doctrine [of recapture] should be limited to those appropriations that contemplated the necessity for such recapture to achieve
their intended beneficial purpose. Otherwise, water properly diverted and applied to beneficial use that remains unconsumed after
use should be regarded as returned to the hydrologic system and
available for use according to state laws once it leaves the appropriator’s lands.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Montana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation
Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5 Golden Gate U.
Envtl. L.J. 265 (2012). MacDonnell would require an intention for
recapture to be allowed. He proposes the application of his reinstatement
of the doctrine to apply across the board, no matter the technicalities of
the different states’ water laws that differentiate between seepage, wastage,
drainage, or return flow.
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cases where those relying on return flow have been protected, and none refers to changes in irrigation methods
or change of crops.44 According to Tarlock, in protecting
return flow, these decisions show a preference for equity
over efficiency under prior appropriation.45 This Article
argues that in terms of both equity and efficiency, return
flow should no longer be part of the water right of the user
returning it to the river.
A farmer entitled to consume as much as she diverted
will do so if it is beneficial for her to consume as much.
She may have incentives to consume all the water she has
a right to divert, not only because that amount may allow
her to produce more, but because of regulatory incentives.
Under prior appropriation, water rights can be forfeited
if they go unused for a specified period of time, no matter what the intent of the user is. The “use-it-or-lose-it”
doctrine implies the loss of all or a portion of the right.
Those forfeiture provisions may motivate the farmer to
divert as much as possible46 and, where using technically
efficient irrigation techniques, the majority or all of the
water diverted will be consumed. Given that an increase in
consumption is likely to harm other users, forfeiture provisions alone cannot achieve their original aim of protecting
the investments made by juniors who were relying on the
unused rights of others.47
Junior users have another source of protection: senior
water right holders may have priority in times of shortage
but they cannot do all they please. Some changes in their
water rights are subject to the “no-injury” rule, which holds
that a senior appropriator cannot make certain changes in
the way it uses its water if they would harm the junior user.
Montana and Wyoming, for example, require prior appropriators to apply for a change in their right when they plan
to alter the type of use, the place of use, or the point of
diversion. This rule reflects the reality that such changes
may harm other users in the stream since they alter the
quantity and quality of the flow. The no-injury rule does
not apply to changes in consumptive use caused by a
change in irrigation methods or crops.48
44. For a comment on these cases, see George Radosevich, Western Water
Laws and Irrigation Return Flow 75, 100 (1978). Two illustrative cases
are Kovacovich and Shelton Farms. In Kovacovich [Salt River Valley Water
Users’ Ass’n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1966)], the court found against a farmer who lined her ditches and used
the recovered water to irrigate land beyond that for which the water right
was granted. In Shelton Farms [Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1974)], the person who
eliminated phreatophytes was found not to be entitled to the water those
plants used to consume and, instead, the downstream users were.
45. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 156.
46. Krista Koehl, Partial Forfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon Compromises
Traditional Principles to Achieve Flexibility, 38 Envtl. L. 1137, 1139 (1998).
In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505 (Or. 1914), is a decision that states that the
water saved by more efficient irrigation systems is forfeited to the state.
47. Charles B. Roe & William J. Brooks, Loss of Water Rights: Old Ways and
New, 35 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst 1, 3 (1989).
48. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 77 Wyo. 80 (Wyo. 1957) (“If the senior
appropriator by a different method of irrigation can so utilize his water
that it is all consumed in transpiration and consumptive use and no waste
water returns by seepage or percolation to the river, no other appropriator
can complain.”). However, in that case, water was not returning to the
same stream.
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For example, a farmer in Arizona has the right to change
from maize production to sugarcane, which consumes
twice as much water,49 and to disregard the effects this
will have on junior appropriators. The same farmer cannot move her production to a different farmland further
upstream if the flow of the river would be affected and her
former junior downstream neighbor would be harmed.
That farmer who was originally growing maize will not
be able to grow sugarcane upstream because it consumes
more and it will harm other users. The differential treatment of those different changes, even though their effects
on juniors are similar, seems incoherent and lacks a justification in terms of allocation efficiency or fairness.
Another source of inconsistency arises in relation to
water transactions. A user can transfer her water right but
the transfer is subject to the no-injury rule. In practice,
this rule has meant that only the amount historically consumed can be transferred.50 It can be said that water rights
have different definitions when used by the original right
holder than when transferred. If the farmer growing maize
sells the water to another farmer who has a field of similar
acreage growing sugarcane, the latter will most likely be
permitted to consume only as much water as the former
was consuming when growing maize.

B.

Statutes Encouraging Agricultural Water
Conservation

Even though the general definition of rights under prior
appropriation does not protect junior users or the environment from changes in irrigation methods or crops, some
state statutes encouraging conservation have acknowledged
the paradox exposed in this Article—that technologically
efficient irrigation methods may increase consumption.
Those statutes do not understand conservation as a synonym of development of supplies through dams as it was
understood in the past, but as a way to save water by some
users to ensure other users can satisfy their demands. These
statutes give incentives to shift irrigation methods granting
rights over the conserved water to the right holder implementing the conservation practices, protecting her also
from forfeiture. Some statutes also give financial incentives
to farmers to help them fund the initial capital investment
needed to implement technically efficient irrigation practices. The statutes either define conservation plainly as a
reduction in the amount consumed historically or subject
the right to conserved water to a no-injury rule.
In 1992, California enacted the Agricultural Water
Conservation and Management Act. The Act defined
conservation as “the reduction of the amount of water
consumed or irretrievably lost in the process of satisfying
beneficial uses which can be achieved either by improving the technology or the method for diverting, transport49. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Irrigation Water Management: Irrigation Water Needs ch. 3 (1986),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/S2022E/s2022e07.htm.
50. See infra Section III.C.
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ing, applying, reusing, salvaging, or recovering water, or
by implementing other conservation methods.”51 This is a
satisfactory definition of conservation, understood as an
increase in overall efficiency in water allocation, such that
no one will be made worse off. Washington’s Trust Water
Rights Program, enacted in 1991, refers to “net water savings,” which are defined as:
the amount of water that is determined to be conserved
and usable within a specified stream reach or reaches for
other purposes without impairment or detriment to water
rights existing at the time that a water conservation project is undertaken, reducing the ability to deliver water, or
reducing the supply of water that would otherwise have
been available to existing uses.

Washington and California have regulated conservation as the reduction in consumption, not giving farmers
the possibility of double-dipping by profiting from their
own purportedly wasteful practices and receiving subsidies
for not conserving water. Thus, in those states, the farmer
installing drip irrigation has the choice of keeping her right
as it is, perhaps facing a reduction in the amount she is
entitled to as a result of her reduced diversion under drip
irrigation, consuming more water, or reducing consumption and being able to take title to the amount of water she
no longer consumes.
The definition of conservation as the reduction in consumption has not been adopted everywhere. Oregon used
to define conservation as “the amount of water, previously unavailable to subsequent appropriators, that results
from conservation measures.” But this policy did not succeed, and very few applications were received. In 2003,
a new statute defined conservation as “the reduction of
the amount of water diverted to satisfy an existing beneficial use achieved either by improving the technology or
method for diverting, transporting, applying or recovering the water or by implementing other approved conservation measures.”52
Apparently, the explanation behind the adoption of
such a definition is one of public choice. Agricultural
interests convinced the Oregon Legislature that this more
open-ended definition would still generate incentives for
conservation. It may indeed generate incentives to install
sprinklers or drip irrigation pipes conserving water that
would otherwise be lost to evaporation, but it may not contribute to overall water efficiency if the consumptive use
is increased despite the reduction in diversion. Strangely

51. Cal. Water Code §10521(a), the Agricultural Water Conservation and
Management Act.
52. Or. Rev. Stat. §537.455: Definitions for ORS 537.455 to 537.500 and
540.510.
		 Colorado has never successfully passed a conservation statute, but the
Colorado Water Conservation Board uses a definition based on decrease in
use: “Water conservation is any beneficial reduction in water loss, waste,
or use. It is the reduction in water use accomplished by implementation
of water conservation or water efficiency measures. It is improved water
management practices that reduce or enhance the beneficial use of water.”
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enough, environmental groups supported the statute,
equating reduced diversion with reduced consumption.53
In addition, Oregon’s conservation statute allows the
farmer to keep 75% of the water conserved, while the
other 25% is allocated to the state. The 25% might be
reduced if the farmer has received public funds to pay for
the change in irrigation systems. This division of the water
conserved—that is, the amount by which the diversion has
been reduced—suggests that the fear of forfeiture for not
diverting all of it may have been a concern. However, in
order to determine the amount conserved, the reduction
of diversion is reduced to ensure that other water rights
are not harmed. This means that a farmer can increase her
consumption by implementing conservation policies, but
will only acquire a right over the amount conserved if her
change does not impose negative externalities on other
users. There is no mention of negative effects on the environment, but the allocation of 25% of the conserved water
may mitigate those concerns. The fact that the statute limits
the amount of water conserved that the user implementing
conservation practices is entitled to when other users are
harmed implies that conservation practices will be treated
more favorably in streams where water is abundant.
Even though the definitions of conservation in the three
statutes analyzed take into account the paradox exposed
in the scientific literature, the farmer may still prefer to do
without the incentives and shift irrigation methods. If the
general definition of prior appropriation is not changed,
a farmer may still find it more profitable to shift irrigation methods, increasing consumption. It may be more
profitable because of the higher yield she produces when
consuming more and because if she increases the amount
consumed today, she will be able to sell a higher amount
of water in the future. Profits from increased consumption may be higher than the profits from a lower yield and
lower water application under drip irrigation today and the
expected profits from using or selling, subject to a more
streamlined procedure, the amount of water she no longer
consumes immediately.
It is important to note that the conservation statutes
analyzed in this Article assume that the farmer was not
wasting water before,54 which means that although many
consider flood or furrow irrigation practices wasteful and
inefficient, the statutes allow farmers to profit from their
previous inefficiency.
Unfortunately, not all initiatives to promote conservation have protected other users from the potential increase
in consumption. This is the case of federal agricultural
programs. The federal Agricultural Water Enhancement
Program, part of the Farm Bill’s Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP), was proven not to achieve real
water conservation. Bills were introduced to correct it,55
53. Ray Huffaker & Normal Whittlesey, The Allocative Efficiency and
Conservation Potential of Water Laws Encouraging Investments in On-Farm
Irrigation Technology, 24 Agric. Econ. 47, 58 (2000).
54. Neuman, supra note 37, at 957.
55. As part of the EQIP, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Natural
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) Agricultural Water Enhancement
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but they were ultimately not approved. These programs
gave subsidies to farmers to implement technically efficient irrigation methods, sometimes in cooperation with
the states.56 Given the potential increase in consumption
and the effects on other users and the environment, those
subsidies may not render social benefits.57

III.

Better Incentives Through a New
Measure of Rights: Consumptive Volume

A.

Definition

Montana v. Wyoming showed the effects at an interstate
level of shifts of irrigation methods, but similar situations
must be arising internally as well. Recently, state policymakers have started to acknowledge the problems that
accompany shifts to efficient irrigation systems. As more
efficient methods are adopted, some farmers may produce
more, but less water may be available for other users. The
conservation statutes of Oregon, Washington, and California illustrate that states are starting to realize the effects.
Those statutes only count as savings the reductions in consumption, not only the adoption of efficient irrigation systems that divert less. None of the states have addressed it
in the general regulation of water rights. The New Mexico
Interstate Stream Commission commissioned a report to
study precisely the increase in consumption that a shift
from flood to drip irrigation can bring about.58 But New
Mexico has yet to take measures to address it. It is time
that prior appropriation evolves, like it has done in the past
to adapt to changes in social values.
Today, consumptive use, as the Idaho Code puts it,
is not part of the definition of the right. The amount of
water put to use when a right holder appropriates the right
Program (repealed by the 2014 Farm Bill; see http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/awep/) funded several
of these projects. NRCS would pay up to $400 per acre, which means it
would cover from 25% to 50% of the capital cost of drip irrigation per acre.
		 In 2013, Sen. Tom Udall (D-N.M.) introduced a bill to make sure that
taxpayer-funded irrigation improvements result in real savings (S. 923,
113th Cong. (2013/2014)—Balancing Food, Farm, and the Environment
Act of 2013) after several studies showed that federal subsidies aiming at
conservation translated into more water consumption. Ron Nixon, Farm
Subsidies Leading to More Water Use, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2013, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/irrigation-subsidies-leading-to-more-wateruse.html?_r=0.
56. In Montana, EQIP aids farmers in switching to more efficient irrigation
systems, generally from flood irrigation to center-pivot sprinkler irrigation.
To receive the funding, farmers must complete the Farm Irrigation
Rating Index (FIRI), which predicts the increase in efficiency that would
result from switching irrigation systems given specific data provided by
the individual. FIRI must report at least a 10% hypothetical increase in
efficiency to ensure eligibility. The FIRI measure of efficiency is neither a
measure of consumption nor diversion. It is a calculation that takes into
account conveyance efficiency and application efficiency. Thus, the goal of
EQIP in Montana is not conservation in the sense of reducing consumptive
use. Rather, the focus is to increase water productivity or yield.
57. Ward & Pulido-Velázquez, supra note 4, at 18219.
58. New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission, Remote-SensingBased Comparison of Water Consumption by Drip-Irrigated
Versus Flood-Irrigated Fields (2013), available at http://nmawsa.org/
ongoing-work/agricultural-water-use/comparison-of-water-consumptionby-drip-irrigated-versus-flood-irrigated-fields/view.
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defines the volume of the said right.59 It is normally measured according to the volume diverted. But this needs
to change. I propose to define water rights both in terms
of diversion and in terms of consumption or depletion.
Adopting consumption as part of the right’s definition will
prevent the detrimental incentives to right holders when
adopting modern irrigation technologies, sometimes aided
by public subsidies funding part of the cost of that investment. But it will also address the effects of other farming
decisions such as a change in crops.
In short, this Article proposes that the farmer should
lose the right to her return flow. Or in other words, a right
holder will be entitled to keep diverting the same amount
but could only consume the amount she had been consuming on average over the past five years, whether or not she
changes the method of irrigation or the crops. The number of years across which to average consumption may be
debatable, but five years is a common measure in water law.
For example, in Washington State, the amount of water
that a consumptive user can donate, sell, or lease to the
state to become a trust water right, that is, a right on behalf
of the environment, is calculated according to the extent
the right was exercised in the past five years.60 This historical account should mitigate the potential moral hazard of
increasing the consumption in the very last period before
the measure was implemented.
Under this proposal, a farmer could decide to keep irrigating using flood or furrow irrigation, diverting the same
amount and consuming the same amount. She could also
choose to install sprinklers and divert less, but she will not
be able to consume more than she did in the status quo.
Even without increasing her consumption when shifting to
sprinklers or drip, her plants may be consuming more than
in the status quo where she used flood irrigation because
part of the ET was lost due to evaporation, but with drip
there may not be any evaporation.
Under my proposal, in the example used in Section I,
farmer A, who has a prior appropriation right of 5 ac-ft,
could only consume 2.2 ac-ft. This is the amount she consumed when she was flooding her field to grow alfalfa. If
she decides to change the irrigation method, as she does in
Scenario 2, she will not be able to consume 2.7 ac-ft as she
did in that example. She would have to keep consuming
2.2 ac-ft at most even though her right would have entitled
her to divert 5 ac-ft. Where using drip, the 2.2 ac-ft may
be consumed by the plants, while with flooding, part of the
amount consumed is lost to evaporation.
In my proposal, current total forfeiture rules will apply
to both dimensions: diversion and consumption. That is,
completely unused rights will be forfeited. Partial forfeiture rules should not apply when the change in the amount
diverted comes from better irrigation practices or changes
to less water-intensive crops. Once the consumptive volume
a right entitles has been defined, reductions in consumption could be sold or leased to other users. Those reductions
59. Idaho Code §42-202B.
60. Wash. Rev. Code §90.42.080(4).
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shall be protected from forfeiture in order to give incentives
to adopt better irrigation practices, as California’s conservation statute does. Users would be protected to keep
diverting as much as they were diverting.
Conversely, if partial forfeiture rules applied to diversion, they could be mostly innocuous to the farmer. If a
farmer installs a more advanced irrigation system and only
allows it to consume the amount that under the prior system was depleted, she will be diverting less than before.
However, for her, losing the difference between the volume she diverts today and the volume she diverted in the
past has no effect. She has no incentive to divert more in
the future, because to do that will imply uninstalling the
new equipment and losing the investment, only to divert
more but consume the same.61 Having said that, since there
might be new innovations in irrigation that could perhaps
require more diversion for the same consumption, diversion needs to remain as one, but not the only, measure of
a water right. Consequently, it would be better to derogate
partial forfeiture provisions for these cases. Additionally,
she may be able to sell a non-consumptive right to the total
amount diverted.
For new permits, including the amount consumed in
the definition of rights could be an opportunity to adopt
a technology-forcing provision.62 Agencies granting water
permits could define the consumptive and diversion volumes of a right according to the best available irrigation
technology instead of their current practice of granting
the amount requested by private parties within the limit
of the water duties,63 which tend to be too generous. For
new permits, drip or microspray may be the technology
chosen because they reduce evaporation and fewer pollutants end up in the river. Agencies could tailor the volume
to each permit depending on the soil and the crop because
the agencies will already have the relevant information in
order to regulate existing permits. Alternatively, they could
create a duty of water, which averages water needs accord61. This would mean that in some cases the river flow may be reduced—not
the amount available for others to use—between the point of intake and the
return of the farmer who is diverting more than before, but not more than
she was diverting in the first place. Thus, some small externalities may occur
that may need to be disregarded.
62. Arizona’s groundwater management regulations include a technologyforcing provision for non-irrigation uses at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-566.
63. Another application of the reasonable-use requirement centers on the water
duty required to satisfy the appropriator’s end use. “Water duty” is generally
equated with the amount of water that, through efficient and prudent
management without unnecessary waste, is reasonably required for land to
produce a maximum amount of crops as are ordinarily grown. “The extent
of the duty to conserve must take into account what conservation measures
are financially and physically feasible.” Water duty requirements take into
consideration the amount of water that may adequately serve the water
requirements of various end uses. The appropriator is not entitled to apply
water to an end use in a wasteful manner.
		
Cal. Water Code §1004 provides that 2.5 ac-ft of water per acre
is the maximum amount of water that can be applied to uncultivated
land. Other water duty factors have been established by the State Water
Resources Control Board and are contained in Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23,
§697. In the absence of a statutory guideline, the applicable water duty
is a question of fact that is dependent on the particular circumstances of
any given case. Scott S. Slater, 1-2 California Water Law and Policy
§2.27 (LexisNexis 2015).
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ing to the most common crops in the area when using the
irrigation technology of their choice.

B.

Effects of the Proposal

1.

Reliance of Junior Appropriators

The priority system in prior appropriation is a mechanism
for sharing the effects of a drought. When there is not
enough water to satisfy the rights of everyone, those who
appropriated the right first will be served first. Senior users
are normally farmers and, thus, they are not necessarily the
ones that value the water most. Similarly, it is implausible
to assume that upstream farmers are more productive than
downstream ones. At equal priority, upstream users have
an advantage over downstream users under the current system: if rights are just measured according to diversion, and
upstream consumption increases, the users downstream
will have less water available to them.
The above is what happened in Montana v. Wyoming,
where pre-1950 appropriators from both states have the
same priority. However, because Wyoming appropriators
decided to change their crops or irrigation methods, there
was not enough water downstream. Similarly, groundwater users, where groundwater and surface water are regulated as if they were two separate bodies of water, may see
their aquifers depleted not by their pumping, but because
some surface water right holders have consumed more
than they used to and, thus, the recharge of the aquifer has
been reduced.64
Those junior or downstream appropriators have been
relying on that return-flow water for decades. Diversion
was a sound measure in the past because it was administrable, but so was relying on the river as junior appropriators or downstream users found it. Those users knew
that if it was a dry year, they may not get enough water.
They could not expect that upstream or senior appropriators would start using their paper rights in full, despite
the doctrines of recapture. Any of those users relying on
the river as it flows to them “frequently cannot ascertain
what portion of the flow of a stream is natural and what
portion represents return flow from upstream users.”65
Recapture of runoff is more the exception than the
rule. 66 Those other users, who relied on the return flow
that some farmers have now reduced, are the ones whose
investment-backed expectations may be defeated under
the current system if the adoption of new irrigation technologies keeps growing.
64. This could happen, for example, in Pixley Irrigation District (California);
see Brett Walton, Spending to Conserve Water on California Farms Will Not
Increase Supply, Circle of Blue, Feb. 28, 2014, http://www.circleofblue.
org/waternews/2014/world/conserve-water-california-not-increase-supply/.
65. George A. Gould, Water Use and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, in
Western Water; Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies (Natural Resources
Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law 1986), http://scholar.law.
colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=western-waterexpanding-uses-finite-supplies.
66. See Section II.
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Streamflow Unaltered

The example in Section II focuses on the interaction
between two farmers. However, there are other users in the
river that may be affected by the increase in consumption
that prior appropriation embraces and that some conservation statutes sanction. In particular, fish and wildlife are
likely to be affected by an increase in consumption, because
there will be less water flowing. The decrease in flow does
not necessarily happen when there is a change in one of the
characteristics of a right or when it is transferred, and these
changes are subject to a review to prevent uncompensated
effects on third parties and the environment.67
Environmental concerns have increased in recent
decades and in particular in the area of water management, where they are expressed in legal regimes like the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 68 the public trust doctrine,
and the protection of instream flows. Instream flows have
been protected via, among other things, minimum flow
requirements or non-consumptive rights. The decision of
the Supreme Court in Montana v. Wyoming69 pays lip service to this developing central theme in the way society
views water. Its analysis focuses only on the theme that
existed at the birth of prior appropriation: water as a commodity. Water was an input to make our economies thrive
through unfettered consumption.70
Today, both beneficial use and the regulation of water
transfers reflect that regard for the environment. Related to
beneficial use and its evolution, the inclusion of instream
non-consumptive uses as beneficial uses stands out. Nowadays, private organizations and/or administrative agencies
can hold rights to protect fish and wildlife. Our concern
for fish species and river ecosystems is also reflected in the
approval procedure in water markets. Transfers of conserved water for less than one year, which imply a decrease
in diversion, are subject to a less demanding procedure in
California, because fewer effects are expected when less
water is used. However, those transactions are still subject
to a binding standard that they produce “no unreasonable
effects on fish and wildlife.”71 This supplemental provision
is necessary because the transactions may alter the geography of where water flows, as in any change to a water right.
Even in the absence of a regulation imposing limits on the
amount consumed or not imposing compensation of harm
to other users, minimum streamflows should be protected
from these changes. In this regard, it may be advisable for
states to at least adopt a provision similar to Oregon’s conservation statute, which allocates 25% of the water conserved to the state.
67. See id.
68. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR Stat. ESA §§2-18.
69. Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 179 L. Ed. 2d 799, 41 ELR 20168
(2011).
70. Barton H. Thompson, Water as a Public Commodity, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 17,
23-24 (2011); Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint
for Change, 61 Or. L. Rev. 483 (1982) (“Antiquated legal interpretations
unsuited to a conservation ethic restrict the ability to manage wisely the
limited waters of the arid west.”).
71. Cal. Water Code §1011(b).
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Fewer Incentives to Grow Water-Intensive
Crops

If rights are defined according to consumptive use, not only
will changes in irrigation methods not increase the amount
of water depleted from the basin, but neither will changes
in crops. Today, a farmer can change from soybeans to
alfalfa without applying for a change in the irrigation permit.72 The expansion of almond farming in California has
received many critiques in the midst of the current drought
because almonds are a permanent crop that cannot be fallowed and consumes more water than tomatoes or grapes.73
It is not feasible for a state water agency to police which
crop each farmer is growing, and such policing seems to
interfere too much with business decisions by the farmer.
Agricultural models could be used to analyze those
changes and how they affect other users, but if the proposal of this Article were to be adopted, there would be no
need to require a farmer to apply for a change in a water
right when deciding to plant a different crop. However, if a
farmer decided to stop growing her current crop, she would
need to choose a crop that consumes the same or less water,
or plant it only in part of her acreage to ensure that her
consumption does not increase.

4.

Incentives to Shift Irrigation Methods
Still Exist

Adoption of irrigation technologies such as drip irrigation
could be beneficial if consumption would not increase.
They could be socially beneficial because, among other
effects, there would not be pollutants sent to the river via
the return flow or runoff, thus creating savings in water
purification, and fewer negative impacts on the environment, except for the potential increase in soil salinity in
some areas. It may be argued that the proposal set forth in
this Article decreases the incentives to adopt drip irrigation
or sprinklers, even though those are beneficial for water
quality, by not allowing users to consume more than they
were consuming before. A farmer when deciding whether
to install drip or sprinklers may decide not to if he cannot
increase the amount he is consuming with a more traditional irrigation method.
My proposal tackles the potential negative externality—
less water available—that shifting to technically efficient
irrigation methods imposes on other users who are relying
on the return flow that a user has been returning to the
river for decades. Drip or sprinklers may have a positive
externality—reduced pollution—too. However, these two
effects on third parties are not in the same currency (water
quantity versus water quality), and the trade off cannot be
made by assuming the positive externality is overall more
socially beneficial.
72. Section II.B. above explains which changes require a change in the permit.
73. California Almond Growers to Expand Orchards, Despite Drought,
Sacramento Bee, Apr. 16, 2014.
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This Article addresses the negative externality in terms
of increased consumption and leaves the management of
nonpoint source pollution problems to clean water regulations. Given that nonpoint sources of water pollution—
mainly agricultural runoff draining into the rivers—can
be regulated, as is the case in some states, compliance with
those regulations may give further incentives to farmers to
change irrigation methods if it were the less costly way to
do so. For example, if a tradable water quality program
were in place, farmers may decide to reduce the amount
they pollute by installing drip or sprinklers and sell the
credit to pollute to an industrial polluter.
The shift to drip and sprinklers may also be beneficial
for individual farmers because they will also save in variable
costs. They will save because drip and sprinkler technologies are less labor-intensive, and they increase yield; they
produce more crop per drop. And there may be more drops
because by shifting irrigation methods, the farmer can capture the amount of water that was evaporating when she
used furrow or flood. Jurisdictions could design the measure of consumption to include more than the water previously consumed by plants and irretrievably lost. It could
include the amount evaporated, increasing the incentives
farmers would have to change irrigation methods.
Drip or sprinklers require some capital investment
upfront. Modern irrigation technologies are costly, and perhaps unaffordable for many farmers, because in the short
term the increase in yield will not be enough to recover
the initial capital investment.74 Multiple jurisdictions have
adopted subsidies in order to decrease the costs that farmers face in adopting those technologies. Those subsidies
could still work under the proposal set forth here. Perhaps,
subsidies are even more necessary, because the increase in
yield would be less if consumption after the installation
cannot be higher than consumption under flood irrigation.
If rights were defined according to consumptive use, those
subsidies will be achieving their real goal.
It may be asked why we should have the taxpayer pay for
those irrigation methods. To decrease the need for public
subsidies, it could be said that perhaps it would be better
to keep current policy where the farmer can increase the
amount consumed so that she can recover the investment
more quickly. In fact, one argument made in passing in the
special master’s report for Montana v. Wyoming is that we
want farmers to be more efficient, even though the result of
adopting those policies is reduced instream flow for other
users.75 Another way to give incentives without relying on
subsidies would be to grant rights to the amount of water
saved, as California does. But granting that right requires
real water savings; consumption must be lower than in the
status quo and, thus, yield may be also lower.
74. The cost of installing sprinklers is around $550 per acre and installing drip
irrigation can average $1,200 per acre. Howard Neibling, Irrigation
Systems for Idaho Agriculture (University of Idaho, College of
Agriculture 1997); Steve Amosson et al., Economics of Irrigation
Systems (2011).
75. Supplemental Opinion, supra note 28, at 29.
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A savings-sharing arrangement like the Oregon legislation established, where the farmer could keep part of the
water she saved but another part is allocated to the state in
proportion to the funds provided, would also be advisable.
Hence, establishing the volume historically consumed as
a definitional variable will allow those systems that grant
rights to the amount of water conserved to work more efficiently. Farmers should therefore have more incentives to
introduce innovations that actually save water. Those regulations, modeled after the California one, could be a companion to the proposal set up here.
In many situations, though, it makes economic sense
to adopt drip irrigation even without increasing consumption and without receiving subsidies.76 The Lower Arkansas Water Management Association proposed a plan for
2015/2016 to be approved by the division engineer in which
the improvements in irrigation do not imply an increase in
consumption. The owner of three farms changed the irrigation method from flood to center pivot sprinklers. Center
pivot sprinklers reduce the surface irrigated because the
corners of the farm cannot be reached by the water. Even
reducing the acreage and keeping consumption constant,
the farmer installed sprinklers and he benefited from it. In
this case, no other users or the environment are going to be
seriously affected by the change because return flows and
effects of deep percolation are accounted for. Thus, this is a
Pareto-efficient improvement.
There are also other techniques that can conserve water
without affecting historic return flows. These techniques
include rotational fallowing, deficit irrigation, or crop
switching. These techniques entail a lower up-front cost so
they will be more attractive to farmers. Some of the techniques may reduce productivity, but lower profits may be
compensated by the lease or sale of the water conserved.77
Calculating the amount actually conserved would be easier
if consumption is adopted as one of the measures of the
water right.

C.

Unintended Benefits: Market Booster

1.

The Indirect Definition of Rights by the
No-Injury Rule

Prior appropriation rights are transferable. But there is a
limit: the no-injury rule. This rule also applies when there
are changes in water rights even if the right holder remains
the same.78 Water transactions cannot be carried out if they
injure third parties, be they other users or the environment.79 Transactions change the status quo. If A—a downstream user—transfers water to B—an upstream one—at
76. Telephone Interview with Karl Nyquist, Vice President, C&A Companies
(July 13, 2015).
77. For a discussion of those techniques and the necessary steps to ensure that
conserved water is easily tradable, see Mark Squillace & Anthony McLeod,
Marketing Conserved Water (working paper, on file with the author).
78. See supra Section II.D.
79. The no-injury rule is followed by all states in the western United States.
Thompson et al., supra note 28, at 307.
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a minimum, there will be less water flowing between A
and B, and other users who were using part of that water or
needed more power to divert water out of the stream may
be harmed. If B ends up consuming more than A used to,
users downstream of A may also be harmed. The transfer
may not make economic sense. It is clear that B values the
water more than A, but if A used to return a certain amount
of water to the river that was used over and over again, and
now B does not return the same amount, we cannot be sure
that the transfer is beneficial. This is so because the value of
that water to A is lower than the total value of that water to
A and the other users jointly.
A system to handle those externalities could rely on private bargaining between the parties A and B and the other
users affected, but transaction costs will be too high and
government or private nongovernmental organizations, if
there are instream flow rights defined, would have to represent the environment. Instead, the system in place requires
users to seek approval before the water agencies when entering into water transactions. Those agencies enforce the noinjury rule. The approval procedure generates transaction
costs that may deter water transfers.
To a great extent, the no-injury rule80 results in limiting
transfers to the amount consumed; a farmer will not be
able to transfer the amount she returned to the river. The
amount returned to the river may have been used by other
farmers, given that agencies have overallocated streams
assuming that farmers do not use all their paper rights.81
Those other users may be harmed if the transaction takes
place. Further, streamflows will be altered, which may, in
many circumstances, translate into harm for the ecosystem.
Oregon, for example, allows farmers to only transfer the
consumptive use, but the Department of Water Resources
interprets this limit generously and normally grants the
consumptive use of the most water-consuming crop in the
area where the seller or lessor of the water right is.
It seems inconsistent that a farmer is allowed to use her
water right fully by changing her crop or her irrigation
method, even if other users are harmed, but she cannot sell
the whole amount of water she is entitled to, 82 reinforcing
the idea that usufructuary83 water rights do not fit a concept of property shaped for land.84 In sum, the no-injury
80. Meyers & Richard Posner propose to minimize the costs arising from
the cumbersome administrative review procedure related to de minimis
externalities. It consists in adopting “substantial injury” or “no unreasonable
effect” as a standard for review, instead of “no injury.” Charles J. Meyers &
Richard A. Posner, Toward an Improved Market in Water Resources
27 (National Water Commission 1971). A standard similar to “substantial
injury” is applied regarding the effects on the environment: transfers
unreasonably affecting fish, wildlife, or other beneficial instream uses are
not authorized in California. Cal. Water Code §§1725 and 1735.
81. Getches, supra note 35, at 155. See also Oregon Hearing on S. 869,
cited in Koehl, supra note 46, at 1160. An additional reason for the
overappropriation is that some junior users may know that they can only
exercise a right in particularly wet years.
82. Mark Squillace, The Water Marketing Solution, 42 ELR 10800, 10805 (Sept.
2012).
83. Conversation with Teri Hranac from Oregon Water Resources Department
(July 11, 2015).
84. Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 Ala.
L. Rev. 679 (2008).
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rule indirectly defines the volume that water rights entitle
their holder to by allowing only the amount consumed
to be sold or leased.85 In addition, some states, like Wyoming, specifically limit the amount to be transferred to the
amount effectively consumed.86 In practice, there might
be situations where the amount that can be transferred is
even lower than the amount historically consumed by the
farmer, where there is a change in the place of use and users
located between the seller and the buyer would have the
water available to them reduced. The proposal of defining
rights according to the consumptive use will give coherence to the dichotomy as to how the volume of the right
is defined depending on which stick in the bundle a right
holder is trying to exercise: use or transfer.

2.

Fewer Potential Externalities:
Streamlined Authorization Procedure

Defining rights according to consumptive use for the purposes of water markets only is not a new idea. This Article
has proposed to adopt consumption as the measure of the
right for all purposes, but consumption has already been
adopted by some conservation regulations, as the previous
section shows, or advanced by some scholars as a variable
defining water rights when it comes to water transactions.87
California’s regulation of water transactions differentiates between short-term transfers (one-year maximum)
of consumed water and other transfers. Short-term transfers of post-1914 prior appropriation rights of consumed
water are subject to a more streamlined review procedure.88
“Consumptively used” water includes “water which has
been consumed through use by evapotranspiration, has
percolated underground, or has been otherwise removed
from use in the downstream water supply as a result of
direct diversion.”89
This definition gives security to downstream users of the
stream because the return flow is not included. Conversely,
in the regulation of long-term transfers, there is no limit as
to the origin of the water that can be transferred. The difference is reflected in the thoroughness of the review pro85. Squillace, supra note 82, at 10804.
86. Wyoming law states:
The change in use, or change in place of use, may be allowed,
provided that the quantity of water transferred by the granting
of the petition shall not exceed the amount of water historically
diverted under the existing use, nor exceed the historic rate of diversion under the existing use, nor increase the historic amount
consumptively used under the existing use, nor decrease the historic amount of return flow, nor in any manner injure other existing lawful appropriators.
Wyo. Stat. §41-3-104 (LexisNexis 2014).
87. See Squillace, supra note 82. See also Ronald N. Johnson et al., The Definition
of a Surface Water Right and Transferability, 24 J.L. & Econ. 273 (1981). For
an analysis of the market inefficiencies arising from the current definition
of prior appropriation rights according to the amount diverted, see H.
Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic
Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J.L. & Econ. 111 (1980).
88. Cal. Water Code §1725 (temporary change in the right).
89. Cal. Water Code §§1745.10, 1745.11. The review procedure for longterm transfers is much less spelled out in the regulation. Transactions cannot
substantially injure other users or unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other
instream beneficial uses. Cal. Water Code §1736.
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cess, which is more expedited for short-term transfers. The
time frame to carry out the review of short-term transfers
is tight. The investigation has to start within 10 days of
the receipt of the petition, and the Board has, on a normal
basis, 35 days after that to render the decision.90 The reason
behind this less-demanding review procedure is that externalities in short-term transfers are not only short-lived,
but also minimized.91 The procedure can be streamlined
because the transactions taking place under this framework are likely to produce fewer externalities, as no more
water is taken from the river than before.
Mark Squillace proposes to define rights both in terms
of the amounts diverted and consumed for purposes of
water transactions—but for all water transactions, not just
for short-term ones. But such a definition by itself cannot
make transfers simpler, as California’s short-term transfers
show, unless the no-injury rule is relaxed. He acknowledges that the high transaction costs imposed today by the
no-injury rule to which water transfers are subject make
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for water markets
to fulfill the role in allocating water flexibly as increasing
scarcity challenges require.92 If only the amount consumed
will be transferable, further streamlining of the review
procedure would be in order for all types of transactions
because the no-injury rule will have a lesser role to play.
Squillace proposes to relax the no-injury rule and considers that a minimal or nonexistent review of transfers of the
90. Barton Thompson Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets,
81 Cal. L. Rev. 671, 705 (1993) (Thompson gives some comparative
data on the duration of approval procedures in many states: “any transfer
applications take only a month or two to resolve, but the average
processing time appears to range from six months to one and one-half
years (with controversial transfers occasionally taking up to several years).”
His data relies on a 1990 study by Robert S. Robinson & Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, 2 The Water Transfer Process as a Management
Option for Meeting Changing Water Demands 47 (Natural Resource
Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law 1990)). This can be
conceptualized as an embellished no-injury rule. Jedidiah Brewer et al., Law
and the New Institutional Economics: Water Markets and Legal Change in
California, 1987-2005, 26 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 183, 195 (2008).
		
The review procedure imposes large transaction costs, which may
discourage some transactions. Transaction costs arising from these review
procedures are always negatively regarded as a waste of money. But, as Bonnie
Colby suggests, perhaps they should not be considered so negative, since
in the absence of a perfect definition of property rights with the resulting
complete internalization of third-party effects, transaction costs could be a
useful tool to ensure that transactions that provide net benefits go forward.
According to Colby, often there are no perfect mechanisms to compensate
for these environmental externalities in western U.S. states because standing
might be controversial and only transactions causing outrageous effects are
barred. Thus, transaction costs arising from the review procedure might be
a good substitute for the lack of perfect compensation. If a transferee’s ideal
benefit function should be benefits from the new water bought minus price
and costs imposed on third parties and the environment, in the absence
of a compensation mechanism but with a lengthy review procedure, the
formula would substitute the external costs compensation by a mix of
compensation to other right holders and the “policy-induced transactions
costs.” The author argues that these costs are not dollars burned, but a
redistribution of dollars from the applicants to the agents intervening in
the transaction review process (agencies, lawyers, or consultants). Bonnie G.
Colby, Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 Am. J.
Agric. Econ. 1184 (1990).
91. Another important reduction of transaction costs in these short-term
transfers in California occurs because they are not subject to the California
Environmental Quality Act.
92. Squillace, supra note 82.
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consumptive amount would accept certain negative effects
on third parties. In fact, he argues that prior appropriation
law already tolerates some negative effects on other users
when farmers change crops or irrigation systems.93
The proposal set forth in this Article will define the
consumptive amount a user is entitled to for all purposes: use in her own land or transfer. For transactions,
a lessened review procedure in line with Squillace needs
to accompany the change. The fact that the volume
consumed is already defined should make transactions
even easier because parties will not need to bring evidence of the amount historically consumed during the
review of transactions.
Australia implemented a regulatory regime that proves
that making rights more fungible increases water market
activity. Some Australian states—Queensland, New South
Wales, Victoria, and South Australia—unbundled their
water rights. Previously, all the sticks were amalgamated in
a single water license. After the reform, which was aimed
at improving water management and enhancing water
transfers, the licenses were divided into as many as four
different rights. A water right holder had four sticks: the
access entitlement, the water allocation, the water resource
work approval, and the site use, which allows water to be
used in a particular location.94 Water allocations embody
the right to withdraw a certain amount of water in a particular season, and are transferable. They are recorded in
water accounts, a system similar to a bank account, which
makes them even easier to transfer. This sharper definition
of water rights increased the activity in the water market
because the rights were more fungible,95 allowing for a
more streamlined transaction approval procedure, and this
contributed to better water management.96
By changing the definition of water rights, adopting
consumption as one of the variables defining the volume,
and making transactions of consumed water easier, this
Article’s proposal is more likely to achieve an efficient allocation of water than the current definition can. If transactions are easier, a farmer who wants to shift to drip irrigation
but who needs to consume more water to do so profitably
may resort to the market to buy the extra water she needs.

It may be argued that the same could happen today if the
increase in consumption harms a junior whose use is more
valuable: the said junior could buy out the senior. The only
difference would be distributional consequences, which
may not matter in terms of efficiency.97 Thus, the current
system may not need to be amended.
Beyond fairness arguments, which favor the proposal
put forward here, current regulation of water transactions
imposes higher transaction costs than the proposal in this
Article. Accordingly, fewer transactions will happen even
in situations where the junior user values the water more
than the senior consuming more as a result of a change in
the irrigation method. Further, under current regulation,
if instream flows are not defined, government or private
parties may need to buy out the senior willing to increase
her consumption. This will not be necessary under the proposal set forth because changes in irrigation methods or
other technically efficient measures adopted by the farmer
will not translate into diminished streamflows.
The Lower Arkansas River Basin, particularly the
2015 Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District
(LAVWCD) Plan Request, shows that this proposal may
also enhance markets. It does so by reducing transaction costs because it matches the current definition of the
amount transferable in practice. But it also enhances markets by motivating farmers to resort to the market when
they want to increase their consumption, making sure that
water is put to the most valuable use. In the LAVWCD,
several farmers installed center pivot systems. Those systems consume more than traditional irrigation methods.
The regulations in the Lower Arkansas River Basin in Colorado require the right holders to make up for the increase
in consumption in order to approve the change in irrigation
method. The district in this example used several sources
to make up for the change in return flows, including water
leases from Pueblo. The LAVWCD has a long-term contract with Pueblo Board of Water Works to provide up to
500 ac-ft per year of fully consumable supplies to meet the
obligations imposed by the regulations implementing the
Arkansas River Compact.

D.

Implementation

93. Id. at 10805.
94. These first two components of the right are personal property, not
appurtenant to land. Such a definition increases the fungibility of water
rights in a similar way as using consumptive use as the measure of the
transferable right. The access entitlement “provides an ongoing right to
a specified share of water available for allocation from a prescribed water
resource.” The water allocation is “the right to take a specific volume of
water for a given period of time, not exceeding 12 months, based on the
volume of water available for allocation in that period.” Each share translates
into a certain water allocation.
95. Lack of fungibility is a problem in water rights. Squillace, supra note 82, at
10804. Another example of fungibility resulting in increased water market
activity is the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. See Jedidiah Brewer et
al., Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual
Forms 11, 33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 130002,
2007), http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2007/ICERwp30-07.pdf.
96. Mike Young, The Role of the Unbundling Water Rights in
Australia’s Southern Connected Murray Darling Basin (2011),
available at http://www.feem-project.net/epiwater/docs/d32-d6-1/CS23_
Australia.pdf.

1.

Mechanisms of Change

Western states have migrated to statutory prior appropriation systems. The agencies granting and enforcing those
permits could review the existing permits and incorporate consumption volume as an additional variable in
their definition. Doing so would be similar to a state
agency-initiated general adjudication where the burden
of proof is arguably on the agency. General adjudications
of streams for which rights need to be quantified are a

97. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 44 (1960);
C. Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and Western U.S. Appropriative Water
Rights, 45 Nat. Res. J. 169 (2005).
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situation where consumptive use as a variable defining
the right could be incorporated.98
Alternatively, the regulation for changes in water rights
could include a provision establishing that a change in the
amount consumed would require approval. Such a provision would imply that the consumptive value would only
kick in whenever the farmer wants to change her current
practices. This provision would be broader than a provision establishing that changes in the irrigation method and
crop need to be approved by the water agency. If only these
two types of potential changes are included, there might be
some increases in consumption that may escape the need
for approval, such as planting more intensively than before.
These individual adjudications may generate many costs to
the individual farmers, and if they do not comply with the
regulations, enforcement may be very difficult because, for
example, there might be no records available to the agency
of which crop the farmer was growing before. If this route
is chosen, further reporting obligations should be imposed
on farmers. Whether using this procedure or a more general regulation applying to all rights, state water agencies,
probably collaborating with their agricultural agencies,
should establish an agricultural register that contains
detailed information about which crop is grown on each
acre of agricultural land.99
In fact, imposing the variable of consumption, while
maintaining the diversion amount, has exactly the same
effect as requiring farmers to apply for changes in their
rights when consumption changes, because it allows farmers to continue with their current practices. So, the choice
of one over another will depend on who should bear the
costs: individuals or the agency. The agency has experts at
its beck and call; hence, it has an advantage. Either the general procedure or an individual adjudication of changes in
water rights where the burden of proof is placed primarily
on the agency builds on this expertise of the agency. The
general procedure will obviously be more lengthy. If that
is the strategy chosen, while it is being implemented, the
cutoff date must be set to avoid opportunistic changes in
crops or irrigation methods, or the time frame established
to calculate average consumption must aim at reducing
moral hazard.
For new rights, the agency may decide to grant permits
fixing diversion and consumption according to the most
efficient irrigation technology. The most efficient irrigation technology socially, not only individually, may be drip
because pollution is reduced, yield increases, and current
rights are not affected. Farmers may or may not adopt
the technology used to calculate irrigation needs. Perhaps
changing the crop, leveling the fields, and optimizing irri-

98. Neuman, supra note 37, at 979 (emphasizing the role that general stream
adjudications may have in redefining beneficial use).
99. The USDA Census of Agriculture and its publicly available maps are a step in
this direction and may be helpful to state agencies (see http://www.agcensus.
usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Ag_Atlas_Maps/), but they
neither amount to a Register nor contain individualized information per
plot of land.
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gation scheduling can spare them the investment while still
complying with the limit set forth in the new permit.
Other systems, like riparian states, could adopt consumption as a potential measure of the right. Permits
granted in regulated riparianism systems100 are very similar
in nature to statutory prior appropriation permit systems
regarding the control over the water right by the agencies
granting them. In fact, the Regulated Riparian Model
Water Code opens the door to adopting consumption
as the measure; it states among the elements of the permit “the amount of return flow, if any, required and any
required place of discharge.”101 However, among regulated
riparianism states, diversion or withdrawal is still the norm
even if, for example, Wisconsin requires the application to
include: “The estimated average annual and monthly volumes and rates of water loss.”102
Colorado is implementing a system similar to the one
proposed in the Arkansas River Basin. The Rules Governing Improvements to Surface Irrigation Systems in the
Arkansas River Basin in Colorado were proposed by the
state engineer and approved by the water court in 2009.103
Those rules aim to comply with the Arkansas River Compact, which is a “depletion” compact; Colorado cannot
consume more water than it used to because the Compact
grants Kansas undiminished flows.104
According to the Supreme Court decision in Kansas v.
Colorado, Colorado’s groundwater regulation violated the
Compact because the increasing number of wells impacted
the amount of water flowing down to Kansas. The state
engineer considered that improvement in irrigation methods could have the same effects, and the aforementioned
rules require users to apply before the state engineer whenever they are changing their irrigation system. There is no
control when farmers change the type of crops. Farmers
challenged the rules before a water court, but they were
100. “Regulated riparianism” is a term coined by and encapsulated in the
water right permit systems adopted by eastern U.S. states to deal with
the shortcomings of the common law of riparianism: among others,
the preference for use on riparian lands, arising from reasonable use
requirements, and the difficulty for cities in supplying their citizens. Joseph
W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 Marq.
L. Rev. 53 (2011). See Robert W. Adler et al., Modern Water Law
231 (2013). Shortages prompted states to also include conservation goals in
their statutes. See Thompson et al., supra note 28, at 136.
101. American Society of Civil Engineers, the Regulated Riparian Model
Water Code: Final Report of the Water Laws Committee §7R-101(g) (Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 2003). See also id. §6R-2-01, when listing
the requirements of an application: “e. the place of the proposed return flow
of withdrawn water; f. an estimate of the projected overall consumptive use
of water.”
102. Wis. Stat. §§30.18(6)(a), 281.35(4), 281.35(5)(a)(7).
103. In the Matter of the Proposed Compact Rules Governing Improvements to
Surface Water Irrigation Systems in the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado,
Case No. 09CW110, Water Division 2, col.
104. Article IV-D of the Compact reads as follows:
D. This Compact is not intended to impede or prevent future beneficial development of the Arkansas river basin in Colorado and
Kansas by federal or state agencies, by private enterprise, or by combinations thereof, which may involve construction of dams, reservoirs and other works for the purposes of water utilization and control, as well as the improved or prolonged functioning of existing
works: Provided, That the waters of the Arkansas river, as defined
in Article III, shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or
availability for use to the water users in Colorado.
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not frontally opposed to the regulations because they
understood that Colorado was trying to avoid a new, costly
interstate conflict with Kansas, and the Supreme Court in
Kansas v. Colorado agreed with the special master that the
Arkansas River Compact was a depletion compact.105 Thus,
Colorado cannot increase consumption.
The office of the state engineer made an effort to reach
out to stakeholders during the drafting process. One of the
arguments employed by the officials was that the Irrigation
Improvement Rules also protect users in Colorado from
the increase in consumption by other users. Everyone is a
junior and a senior to another water user. The proposal of
adopting consumption as one of the definitional variables
of the water right will face a similar political economy as
Colorado faced. Farmers are likely to be the losers in any
water law reform in the future. Urban water savings are not
enough to mitigate the scarcity crisis. Agriculture must be
the source of potential mitigation. The proposal put forward in this Article is more palatable for the agricultural
sector because it does not force farmers to incur any new
investments, it allows farmers to keep their business as
usual, and it does protect them from increases in consumption by other farmers.

2.

Measuring Is Possible

Diversion was administratively sound as a measure of the
right in the absence of meters, but today we can rely on
meters and models to measure consumption. It will take
time to decouple different elements of water rights by
including in the definition not only the flow withdrawn
(cubic feet per second) as the measure, but also the volume
consumed (acre-feet). First, not all water rights are wellrecorded. But this problem is not particular to the amendment to prior appropriation rights proposed here. Second,
water right holders do not have meters measuring the
diversion, much less their consumption.106 But they could
have their consumption estimated by agricultural models that can approximate the amount depleted given the
type of soil, the crop selected, and the irrigation method.
These models, like those used in technical studies cited in
this Article, could only provide estimates, yet they will be
cheaper than relying on expert testimony in an adversarial
process, where determinations of historical use for the purposes of water transfers have proven to be very costly.
It must be acknowledged, however, that courts in the
past have been reluctant to accept evidence from models or
experiments, instead of actual practices.107 But since there
is extensive experience in the use of sprinklers and drip irrigation, the agencies could base their estimates on actual
data, not mere assumptions. In addition, models such as
the Penman-Monteith, recommended by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, have been
105. 514 U.S. 673, 675, 115 S. Ct. 1733, 1736, 131 L. Ed. 2d 759, 767 (1995).
106. Neuman, supra note 37, at 985.
107. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1983). See also In re SBA Case No. 39576 (Idaho 1997) (commenting in
special master report on the engineering model used by Idaho).
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used to calculate ET for a long time by water agencies,108
even in the context of water markets.109
The Compact Rules Governing Improvements to
Surface Water Irrigation Systems in the Arkansas River
Basin in Colorado use the Irrigation System Analysis
Model (ISAM) to evaluate the changes brought about by
the change in irrigation methods.110 It helps reduce costs
because each user will not need to hire an engineer to
do a study. There are two parts to the model. One establishes the baseline and makes a threshold determination of
whether changes in irrigation method will increase consumption by comparing the water balance with and without the improvement during the period 1997-2006. This is
a representative period of diverse water supply conditions.
The second part is a model that helps the farmer to
implement the changes in the upcoming year by calculating her historical consumption in a year similar to what the
upcoming one is expected to be. This model requires very
little information from the farmers. They need to provide
only “the number of acres irrigated by each type of system;
any change in acreage due to the improvement . . .; the
surface water right or rights on that acreage (or the number
of ditch shares, if applicable); and whether there is supplemental irrigation from a well.”
Models, though technically complex, have been a tool
welcomed by the farm sector in Colorado. Farmers have
welcomed the ISAM model given the office of the state
engineer’s willingness to work on updates if new information suggests that the model is too stringent. Even if the
route taken is a case-by-case adjudication when a farmer
wants to introduce a change in her water right, a model
to be applied across the board should be approved beforehand, with an appropriate notice-and-comment period.

E.

Takings Challenges

Limiting the amount that a holder of a prior appropriation
right can consume to the amount consumed on average
over the past five years might raise takings challenges when
those limitations are imposed on existing rights. General
stream adjudications do not amount to a taking even when
resulting in adverse effects on the rights. However, water
agencies’ regulations restricting existing rights, be they
common-law or permit-based prior appropriation rights,
are likely to be challenged on takings grounds. Given that
such regulations will be state regulations, the private right
holder may assert her claim based on the state and federal
constitution. The analysis here focuses on the latter.
The first step in analyzing whether there has been a taking is to ask whether water rights are property protected
by the Fifth Amendment. Landmark judicial decisions on
108. California Department of Water Resources, Agricultural Water Use Models,
http://www.water.ca.gov/landwateruse/models.cfm (last visited Oct. 12,
2016).
109. Lana Jones & Bonnie G. Colby, Measuring, Monitoring, and
Enforcing Temporary Water Transfers: Considerations, Case
Examples, Innovations, and Costs (2012).
110. Rule 9.B.i.
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water rights takings have not spent much time discussing
the nature of the water rights; they have assumed they
were protected. Some commentators argue that water
rights are not property with respect to takings, only with
respect to protection under the Due Process Clause given
their public property nature and how subject to the control of government they are.111 But those commentators
are in the minority.112
Assuming that water rights are protected, the second
step of the analysis is to assess whether we are facing a categorical or per se taking, or one that requires a balancing
test. There are two types of categorical takings: physical
and those without physical invasion but where the regulation wipes out any economic value the right might have.
Regarding water, the doctrine is muddy. In Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage District v. United States,113 the court
stated that a reduction in the amount of water available for
pumping as a result of complying with the ESA constituted
a physical taking, even though the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service did not
take possession of the water but mandated the reduction.114
Tulare is still an exception, being often rejected by subsequent decisions.115 If a court were to follow the Tulare reasoning, then the redefinition of rights proposed here may
amount to a physical taking,116 and thus require compensation because there will not be a difference between the
government actually taking the water and not allowing the
farmer to consume it.
The second type of categorical takings—elimination of
all economic value—arising from the decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,117 does not fit the situation
at hand, where the amount of water the farmer can consume is limited to the amount consumed on average for the
period chosen. In the proposal put forward by this Article,
the farmer could keep her business as usual; she may keep
diverting the same amount if she returns the same amount
to the river in the form of return flow. She may also divert
only the amount to be consumed if she has installed some
111. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 84.
112. Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 253, 275 (2013).
113. 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 31 ELR 20648 (2001). See Melinda Harm Benson,
The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth
Amendment, 32 Envtl. L. 551 (2002).
114. 32 Envtl. L. at 555. In the Tulare case, the plaintiffs were contractors
receiving water from the State Water Project. As Benson points out, the
court did not discuss at length whether those rights were interests protected
under the Fifth Amendment. Regulations in other fields have also been
considered physical takings. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 17 ELR 20918 (1987), where a landowner was required to provide an
easement to receive a building permit, required an essential nexus between
the burden imposed by the regulated activity and the restriction. In this
case, increasing consumption imposes externalities on other users and
the public. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 24 ELR 21083 (1994),
further refined the nexus requiring the connection to be proportionate.
If historical consumption is adopted as a new limit defining water rights,
there is no burden imposed on the holder of a water right because she can
keep irrigating, and the fact that she cannot increase her consumptions is
not disproportionate.
115. Owen, supra note 112, at 273.
116. Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as “Property” Through Takings
Litigation: Is There a Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 Envtl. L.
115, 122 (2012).
117. 505 U.S. 1003, 22 ELR 21104 (1992).

46 ELR 11065

irrigation method, such as trickle irrigation, which does not
produce return flow. This means that the farmer will not
see her potential economic benefits reduced with respect to
the status quo. Lucas’ categorical regulatory taking requires
the deprivation of all economic use of the right, in that case
the land, which is not what limiting the amount of water
consumed to the historical average entails.
Once the possibility of categorical taking is excluded,
the third step is to determine whether there has been a
taking under the balancing doctrine resulting from Penn
Central. If the court undertakes the regulatory takings
analysis following Penn Central, the proposal advanced in
this Article will most likely survive the challenge. This type
of analysis is the most common in water rights takings cases.118 The factors to be considered when analyzing whether
the regulation has gone too far are:
(1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant”;
(2) “particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations . . .”; and
(3) “the character of the governmental action. A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government . . ., than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.”119
Here, the economic impact is nonexistent. First, it is
important to note that water rights have been given for
free.120 Second, they are already heavily regulated; for example, they are subject to forfeiture if not used121 and there are
no defeated expectations. Much as in Penn Central, where
the station could continue to be used as it had been used in
the past, in this case, if the farmer wants to keep using the
water the way she has been using it for decades, she can. If
instead she decides to install sprinklers or drip irrigation,
she may incur investment expenses, but it can be a profitable investment even if she keeps consumption constant.
Alternatively, if a farmer has incurred the investment
expenses for a more advanced irrigation system before
the proposed definition is adopted and, thus, started consuming more than she used to, the consumption measure
would take her most current consumption into account.
So, if the farmer incurred those expenses calculating that
she can consume as much as she diverted and invested
more than she would have if she knew she would only be
allowed to consume the amount she had been consuming,
she would still be able to use the amount of water she was
planning to because the investment is prior to the redefinition. Much along the lines of Penn Central, where the
118. Owen, supra note 112, at 287.
119. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 8 ELR 20528
(1978).
120. Squillace, supra note 82, at 10803.
121. Id.
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railroad company was not able to build a 50-story building, but still could build a less-tall building or sell its air
rights,122 farmers who still choose to shift irrigation methods may be able not only to use the water consumed by the
plants when using flood irrigation, but also the amount
that evaporated.
Finally, consideration of the character of the government
action may allow the public trust doctrine to play a role. As
the Mono Lake decision stated in 1983, water is protected
under the public trust doctrine.123 Accordingly, if the government is acting as the trustee for the public in order to
make sure water is managed in the most beneficial way possible for society by regulating existing water rights, such a
regulation should not be considered a taking.124 In this case,
the government wants to protect not only other users who
are relying on the water returned by the farmers, but also
instream flow, which would be diminished if the definition of prior appropriation rights remains unchanged and
the adoption of innovative irrigation systems is encouraged.
Beyond the fairness of water allocation, without the redefinition proposed in this Article, a change in irrigation methods is not likely to bring about the socially efficient solution.
Further, arguments have been made that the takings
doctrine should not be an obstacle to changes in water law
if the changes reduce waste. It could be said that to some
extent the proposal of defining rights according to the volume consumed, instead of just the volume diverted, is a
way to prevent users from profiting from their waste. Some
farmers use antiquated irrigation methods and do not try
to adopt simple measures to save water like watching carefully the times when they irrigate. Today, flood irrigation,
still the main type of irrigation used in the United States,
could be considered archaic. Technology has advanced,
and farmers have not always caught up.
The fact that farmers’ practices have lagged behind
provides one further reason this proposal should survive
the takings challenge. Stephen Shupe, in his blueprint for
change in western water law, reads the Oregon Supreme
Court decision Hough v. Porter125 as saying that the volume
of the water right may change as technology advances.126
The definition of property rights evolves as technology
changes,127 and water rights should be no different. While
Shupe asks for a more current interpretation of waste
122. Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: What Do We Do
With Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 Va.
Envtl. L.J. 43, 51 (2004).
123. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 13 ELR
10272 (Cal. 1983) (commonly known as the “Mono Lake” case).
124. Owen, supra note 112, at 296 (analyzing natural rights property theories
and their implications for takings).
125. 51 Or. 318, 95 P. 732, modified, 51 Or. 318, 420, 98 P. 1083, 1102 (1908),
aff’d on rehearing, 51 Or. 318, 102 P. 728 (1909).
126. Shupe, supra note 70, at 496:
This holding recognizes that while appropriators have a vested
right to irrigate their land, the volume of water associated with
this right may change as technology develops. With the advent
of more efficient techniques, the excess water demands of the old
systems are “declared to be wasteful and have been only a privilege
and not a right.”
127. Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights 16 (1989).
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doctrines and better enforcement,128 this Article proposes
introducing another dimension to the definition of property rights.

F.

Alternatives to the Adoption of Consumption

Instead of reforming prior appropriation to include an
additional variable to the definition, as this Article proposes, there are other amendments that could partially
address the same issues. The first variation would be to
require approval of any change in irrigation methods. The
provisions regulating the approval of changes in the place
of use or type of use are already in place. If a change in the
method of irrigation were to be included, then it would
be subject to the no-injury rule. In this case, consumption
will only enter into the picture once a change in irrigation
method triggers it. Administrative costs would be lower,
but the risk of moral hazard is greater because unless the
consumption amount is fixed for everyone at the same
time, farmers would have an incentive to increase consumption using other methods not to be constrained when
in the future they change irrigation methods.
This proposal is similar to the requirements established
in the Lower Arkansas Valley, where a farmer cannot
increase the amount she has been consuming. If, instead,
only a no-injury rule were in place, a farmer could increase
the amount consumed if there were no negative effects
for the environment or for other users. The Lower Arkansas framework also mitigates moral hazard because the
amount consumed is not allowed to change from historical
consumption levels. The main problem of subjecting the
change of irrigation method to the regulation of change
in water rights, or adopting the approach of the Lower
Arkansas Basin, is that not all production changes aimed
at efficiency and resulting in changes in consumption are
shifts in irrigation methods. The list of triggers of changes
in water rights provisions could be endless.
A second option would be to enforce the prohibition
against waste, reducing the amount available for each
farmer. If current flooding practices are not considered
socially acceptable, the permits could be reduced. However, it is unclear how the amount of water awarded to a
right holder once waste is discounted would be calculated
or whether a particular technology would be imposed. In
any case, if provisions against waste are strengthened and
rely on innovative technologies, they must take into consideration the impact on consumption given the reliance
of other users and the dependence of the environment on
return flows. The effects would be very similar to the ones
proposed in this Article. But there are two main differences. First, using anti-waste provisions implies that the
agricultural sector would be blamed and that sector may be
less willing to accept such an enforcement policy. Second,
it would also be less welcome by private parties because
they would not be allowed to continue with their current
128. Shupe, supra note 70.
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practices. They will be required to improve the conveyance
system or the irrigation method.
The third alternative implies a more acute departure
from the current system: bill farmers for the amount of
water they consume, not the amount they divert. Harm to
other users may still exist, but a pricing mechanism could
be envisioned that would achieve an efficient solution.
Such a scheme may prove unfeasible because water pricing
is a thorny issue. A pricing scheme may be more difficult
to implement than the proposal presented in this section
for reasons of political economy. In addition, this proposal
would require calculating current consumption and, thus,
it would be more costly to administer than adopting consumption as one of the variables defining prior appropriation rights.
The fourth alternative is aimed at achieving the best
allocation possible, not at amending the current system
per se. There could be a system where instream flows
are defined as reserved water and all the water over that
amount is allocated using rights defined according to
diversion with or without a no-injury rule. In such a hypothetical ideal world, parties could negotiate over the externalities imposed and water should end up in the fields of
those who value it the most. Under a no-injury rule, the
farmer who wants to increase his consumption would pay
to compensate those harmed. Or, without a no-injury rule,
those harmed would pay the farmer not to increase consumption if they value water more than he did. However,
a river is not the world of blackboard economics. A change
in a water right will affect a large number of users who may
not find it beneficial to bargain with the right holder who,
thus, will not internalize the social cost of his action.
The proposal advanced in this Article assumes that consumption will fill the meaning of beneficial use when it
comes to the volume, and the establishment and administration of those limits will be in the hands of the water agencies as it is today. Instead of relying on bargaining between
private parties, a liability system could also be enforced by
a water agency. The agency would make a farmer pay if she
exceeds her consumption limit. It may be difficult to identify who is consuming more, but it would be possible to
measure the reduction in stream flow accounting for natural variances. If that is the case, a system where every user is
liable for the difference between the actual amount and the
amount that should be flowing in the stream should provide the correct incentives to ensure that the user does not
increase her consumption.129 However, this framework is
a departure from the traditional enforcement mechanisms
in water law that have been reactive; enforcement actions
are undertaken if another user or someone representing the
environment files a complaint because she or the ecosystem
is being affected.

129. This idea was put forward by Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Total Liability
for Excessive Harm, in Getting Incentives Right 74-91 (2014). The
authors discuss the pollution of a river, which is a case analogous to the one
presented here. Id. at 86.
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This Article’s proposal to add consumptive volume to
the definition of water rights is an incremental improvement of the current system of prior appropriation. It would
not require farmers to undergo any change in their production methods. Thus, there should not be a farming-sector
upheaval against it. Adopting consumption as part of the
definition tackles not only a change in irrigation methods,
but also any change in agricultural production that results
in increased consumption. Such an amendment may harm
some farmers, but would also protect junior right holders
and prevent socially undesirable behavior. In addition, once
a model to calculate consumption is adopted, administering the system would be less daunting. In Colorado, the
model used in the Lower Arkansas Basin has been widely
accepted. By settling the amount of water a user is entitled
to as the average of water consumed during the past five
years, the race to consumption will be prevented.

IV.

Conclusion

Water is getting scarcer in the western United States and
elsewhere. The doctrine of prior appropriation, which regulates water allocation in that region, does not live up to
current challenges. Water is primarily allocated to the agricultural sector, which still uses archaic irrigation methods
and incentivizes the planting of water-intensive crops. Time
and time again, farmers are blamed for the water crisis or
targeted as the source of the remedy. Prior appropriation
is a doctrine “designed to allow as many people to use as
much water as possible.”130 But the provisions against waste
have not had teeth. Those farmers who are using purportedly wasteful practices are not considered to be in violation
of the law.
Policymakers, media, and scholars claim that the agricultural sector should install efficient irrigation systems,
such as sprinklers or drip irrigation, either as part of a more
thorough enforcement of anti-waste provisions or with a
soft-law approach. These irrigation systems produce more
crop per drop. However, most proposals to modernize irrigation fail to understand that those technically efficient
irrigation systems may reduce the amount withdrawn from
the field, but not the overall amount consumed. Those systems may be more efficient and less wasteful than flood
or furrow irrigation at the individual level, but not in the
aggregate. Drip irrigation or sprinklers may increase consumption in water-short scenarios. Given how overallocated rivers are, the increase in consumption by one user
translates into others not being able to access that water.
The situation after the change is not only unfair because
users may have been relying on that water for decades, but
may also be inefficient because we cannot be sure that the
new allocation maximizes the value of water.
The translation between technological efficiency at the
field level and efficiency of the overall water allocation is
not automatic, and illustrates another instance where regulation borrowing technical terms has had unintended con130. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 152.
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sequences. Just as energy regulations are now taking into
account the rebound effect, it is time for water regulations
to do so too.
Even though some conservation statutes only consider
savings arising from changes in irrigation when they effectively reduce the amount consumed, prior appropriation
has lagged behind. Under prior appropriation, there are
no barriers to a farmer increasing the total amount she
consumes when she changes the irrigation method or the
crop even if other users or the environment are harmed.
To achieve the conservation goal of making water available to other users, the volume of water rights needs to be
defined not only according to the amount diverted, but
also according to the amount consumed or depleted.
Incorporating this measure of consumption will not
only ensure that changes in irrigation bring real water savings, but will also discourage the adoption of water-intensive crops when, to do so profitably, water use would have
to increase. This proposal also has ancillary benefits, thus,
if adopted, water transactions would be subject to less scrutiny because fewer transaction costs are likely to arise. In
fact, some authors have already proposed the adoption of

consumption as the measure of water rights only regarding
water transactions.
Prior appropriation is a doctrine that has evolved over
time.131 The time has come for it to evolve again. The doctrine served us well in the past, but it is time to abandon
the unfettered consumption paradigm for one that centers on efficient use, real conservation, and environmental
concerns. The proposal of defining rights according to the
volume historically consumed protects the status quo, but
does not ossify it: it allows changes if these certainly bring
social benefits.
Scrubbers were the solution to sulfur dioxide (SO2) pollution adopted in the late 1970s Clean Air Act regulations.
The reduction in emissions did not happen: midwestern
power plants used high-sulfur coal.132 Scrubbers cleaning emissions from high-sulfur coal or drip irrigation in
water-scarce overallocated aquifers are not solutions to acid
rain or water scarcity. As the SO2 example and this Article
show, technology can be a solution for our environmental
problems, but only when accompanied by a proper regulatory framework.

131. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West,
41 Nat. Resources J. 769, 770 (2001) (“The distinguishing feature of
prior appropriation is its continual evolution in response to a changing
West. Because prior appropriation is grounded in both abstract
principles of justice and hard experience, it has constantly had to adapt
to changed conditions.”).
132. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: Or
How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out
for High-Sulfur Coal Producers (1981).
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